First published in English in 1966, Essays in Analysis addresses the problems in logic and foundations of mathematics, metaphysics, and epistemology. The problems are all root problems in their fields and range from questions concerning our knowledge of the external world to questions about logical entailment, mathematical proof, and induction. Their treatment is not guided by any underlying systematic view, as is characteristic in speculative philosophy. The unity and orientation of the collection are instead provided by the method employed throughout, the method of analysis. A central method of philosophy from Zeno to the present has been analysis of concepts, and the guiding idea throughout these essays is that analysis is the only means by which philosophers can bring clarification to their subject. The complaint has been made that clarity is not enough; but unless it is steadfastly pursued, obscurity and confusion are free to pass for profundity. As will be evident from even a cursory view reading of these studies, all are deeply influenced by Moore and Wittgenstein, with whom the author studied for some years at Cambridge university. This is an interesting read for scholars and researchers of philosophy.

First published in English in 1966, Essays in Analysis addresses the problems in logic and foundations of mathematics, metaphysics, and epistemology. The problems are all root problems in their fields and range from questions concerning our knowledge of the external world to questions about logical entailment, mathematical proof, and induction. Their treatment is not guided by any underlying systematic view, as is characteristic in speculative philosophy. The unity and orientation of the collection are instead provided by the method employed throughout, the method of analysis. A central method of philosophy from Zeno to the present has been analysis of concepts, and the guiding idea throughout these essays is that analysis is the only means by which philosophers can bring clarification to their subject. The complaint has been made that clarity is not enough; but unless it is steadfastly pursued, obscurity and confusion are free to pass for profundity. As will be evident from even a cursory view reading of these studies, all are deeply influenced by Moore and Wittgenstein, with whom the author studied for some years at Cambridge university. This is an interesting read for scholars and researchers of philosophy.

First published in English in 1966, Essays in Analysis addresses the problems in logic and foundations of mathematics, metaphysics, and epistemology. The problems are all root problems in their fields and range from questions concerning our knowledge of the external world to questions about logical entailment, mathematical proof, and induction. Their treatment is not guided by any underlying systematic view, as is characteristic in speculative philosophy. The unity and orientation of the collection are instead provided by the method employed throughout, the method of analysis. A central method of philosophy from Zeno to the present has been analysis of concepts, and the guiding idea throughout these essays is that analysis is the only means by which philosophers can bring clarification to their subject. The complaint has been made that clarity is not enough; but unless it is steadfastly pursued, obscurity and confusion are free to pass for profundity. As will be evident from even a cursory view reading of these studies, all are deeply influenced by Moore and Wittgenstein, with whom the author studied for some years at Cambridge university. This is an interesting read for scholars and researchers of philosophy.