Edited by Michael D. Noel, Professor, Department of Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, USA

• Contents:Preface xiPART I COMPETITION THEORY 1 Auction theory 2Daniel R. Vincent2 Buyer cartels 8Brianna L. Alderman and Roger D. Blair3 Collusion and supergames 12Michael D. Noel and Freddie Papazyan4 Contracting with moral hazard 24George Georgiadis5 Demand estimation 38Steven Berry6 Drip pricing 43Andrew Rhodes7 False advertising 48Andrew Rhodes8 Information 52Michael R. Baye and Jeffrey T. Prince9 Innovation 58Kevin A. Bryan10 Insurance competition under asymmetric information 64Pierre-André �Chiappori11 Machine learning 68Syed Muhammad Ishraque Osman12 Market failure 76Van Kolpin and Connor Thomas Wiegand13 Monopoly 81Bret Dickey and Daniel L. Rubinfeld14 Oligopoly 85Lynne Pepall and Dan Richards15 Price discrimination 90Jiawei Chen and Matthew Shum16 Productivity 95Jan De Loecker and Chad Syverson17 Two-sided platforms 100Paul Belleflamme and Johannes Johnen18 Vertical integration and mergers 109Luke Froeb and Michael VitaPART II ANTITRUST LAW 19 Antitrust law in the U.S. 115Layne E. Kruse and Eliot F. Turner20 Antitrust law in the European Union 122Alison JonesPART III ANTITRUST ISSUES 21 Concentration 132Christopher T. Taylor22 Exclusive contracts 136Giacomo Calzolari and Frank Verboven23 Franchising 143Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade24 Market definition 149Lawrence J. White25 Mergers: coordinated effects 155Elisa Greene Morales and Timo Klein26 Mergers: countervailing effects 164Nathan H. Miller and Gloria Sheu 27 Mergers: unilateral effects 169 Michael D. Noel 28 Monopolization 181 Bret Dickey and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 29 Most Favoured Nation and parity clauses 186 Amelia Fletcher 30 Patents 191 Cesare Righi and Valerio Sterzi 31 Pay-for-delay patent cases 200 Kristopher Hult 32 Price fixing and conspiracy 205 Michael D. Noel 33 Resale price maintenance 219 Kenneth G. Elzinga and John P. Bigelow 34 Robinson-Patman Act and price discrimination 225 Christina DePasquale 35 Standard Setting Organizations 231 Timothy Simcoe 36 Tying and bundling 237 Jorge Padilla 37 Vertical Restraints 243 Gregory J. Werden PART IV REGULATION THEORY 38 Regulation categories 249 Lawrence J. White 39 Regulation methods 257 Mark A. Jamison 40 Regulatory goals and implementation 263 David E. M. Sappington PART V INDUSTRY CASE STUDIES IN COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND ANTITRUST 41 Agricultural cooperatives and marketing orders 271 John M. Crespi and Richard J. Sexton 42 Airlines 280 J. Forbes 43 Automobiles and CAFE standards 285 Misak Avetisyan 44 Banking and finance 289 Robert Clark and Jean-François Houde 45 Black markets 298 Gregory DeAngelo, Margaret Kohl and Bianca Nigri 46 Electricity markets 306 David P. Brown and Andrew Eckert 47 Emission regulations 313 Misak Avetisyan 48 Financial securities 317 Dan Bergstresser 49 Health insurance markets 321 Michael A. Morrisey 50 Hospital and physician markets 328 Michael A. Morrisey 51 Housing and real estate markets 334 Thomas Davidoff 52 Medicare advantage 342 Keaton Miller 53 Mobile networks and broadband 349 Thomas W. Hazlett 54 Online competition 359 Mark A. Jamison 55 Pharmaceuticals 365 Luca Maini 56 Platform businesses 372 David S. Evans 57 Railroad freight 382 Russell Pittman 58 Retail sector 386 Emek Basker 59 Technology and antitrust: lessons from Google, Microsoft, and ATT 390 Shane Greenstein 60 Telephone services 399 Andrew Kearns and Mo Xiao 61 Video distribution 409 Marion McCutcheon and Amanda D. Lotz Index 418

‘Showcasing over 60 surveys from global leading economic and legal scholars, this Encyclopedia looks at what competition is, what it does, when it works well and when it does not. It investigates how best to protect and preserve competition through regulation or antitrust enforcement and reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the major antitrust laws along with over 100 years of Supreme Court interpretations of them. The included case studies provide historical context and also guidance for the future from the many lessons learned.