Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War

An Analysis

Häftad, Engelska, 2009

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This volume examines the military strategy and issues that Egyptian war planners faced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Of major interest is the relationship between the political and military leaders and how that affected the buildup and course of the conflict. Taking this as a starting place, the author concentrates on how Soviet military doctrinal changes presented themselves between the conclusion of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2009-07-21
Mått178 x 254 x 15 mm
Vikt517 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor286
FörlagMcFarland & Co Inc
ISBN9780786442539

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Table of ContentsAcknowledgments Foreword by Major General Shlomo Gazit (Ret.) Preface Introduction: The Egyptian Military Concept on the Eve of the Yom Kippur War 1. The Egyptian Army: From the Six-Day War to the End of the War of Attrition 2. Israel’s Defense System on the Sinai Front 3. Egypt Prior to the Yom Kippur War: Acceptance of the Soviet Warfare Doctrine 4. Potential Problems in the Campaign: Planning the Military Solutions 5. The Soviet Warfare Doctrine and Its Application by the Egyptians Conclusion Appendix A: The Soviet Warfare Doctrine—The Attack at the Divisional and Field Army Levels Appendix B: The Development of Deception in the Soviet Warfare Doctrine Appendix C: The Infantry Division Crossing a Water Obstacle, Order No. 41 from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Appendix D: The Second Infantry Division’s Attack Order in the Yom Kippur War Appendix E: Battle Order No. 1 for Operation “Granite 2 Improved,” Issued by the Commander of the Seventh Division Appendix F: The IDF’s Defense System on the Suez Canal and Its Capture by the Attacking Forces Chapter Notes Bibliography Index