Economics of Constitutional Law

Edited by Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution and Visiting Professor of Law, New York University Law School, US

• Contents:Volume I: The Structural ConstitutionAcknowledgementsIntroduction The Law and Economics of Constitutionalism Richard A. EpsteinPART I: SELF-INTEREST AND CONSTITUTIONS1. James Madison ([1787] 1961), ‘The Federalist. No X. (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Continued)’2. Cass R. Sunstein (1985), ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’3. Robert Cooter (2002), ‘Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy’PART II THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION ASeparation of Powers4. Saul Levmore (1992), ‘Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?’5. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1992), ‘Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse’6. Eric R. Claeys (2004), ‘Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’7. Jide Nzelibe (2006), ‘A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution’BFederalism8. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’9. Richard A. Epstein (1987), ‘The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power’10. Michael W. McConnell (1988), ‘Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure’11. J. Robert S. Prichard with Jamie Benedickson (1983), ‘Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Federalism and Internal Barriers to Trade’12. Jonathan H. Adler (2001), ‘The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism’13. Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan O. Sykes (2001), ‘The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause’CUnconstitutional Conditions14. Richard A. Epstein (1988), ‘Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent’Name IndexVolume II: Individual RightsAcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I PART I PROPERTY AND CONTRACT 1. Richard A. Epstein (1986), ‘An Outline of Takings’2. Margaret Jane Radin (1988), ‘The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings’3. Daniel A. Farber (1992), ‘Economic Analysis and Just Compensation’4. William A. Fischel (1991), ‘Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?’5. Thomas W. Merrill (1986), ‘The Economics of Public Use’6. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky (2006), ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’7. William A. Fischel (1987), ‘The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis’8. Daniel R. Fischel and Alan O. Sykes (1999), ‘Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract’9. Richard A. Epstein (1987), ‘The Public Trust Doctrine’PART II FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGION 10. R.H. Coase (1977), ‘Advertising and Free Speech’11. Fred S. McChesney (1988), ‘A Positive Regulatory Theory of the First Amendment’12. Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom’13. Daniel A. Farber (1991), ‘Free Speech without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment’PART IIIDUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 14. Cass R. Sunstein (1984), ‘Naked Preferences and the Constitution’15. Herbert Hovenkamp (1988), ‘The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process’Name Index

‘Richard Epstein has compiled a brilliant collection of essays that explore the insights of economic theory on such diverse constitutional issues as separation of powers, federalism, takings, free speech, freedom of religion, and due process of law. These essays illuminate and challenge fundamental questions about the meaning and application of our constitution.’