Del 49 - International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RENT SEEKING

Inbunden, Engelska, 1995

Av Robert D. Tollison, Roger D. Congleton

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This collection brings together the classic papers on the economics of rent seeking. These papers date from Gordon Tullock's original 1967 paper which first put forth the idea that the pursuit of transfers was socially costly. Other classic papers by Anne Krueger and Richard Posner are included, as well as a series of more recent papers which trace the evolution of the literature on this important innovation in economic theory.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1995-01-01
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieInternational Library of Critical Writings in Economics series
FörlagEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd
ISBN9781858980058

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Nationalekonomi inom Ekonomi och ledarskap

INTRODUCTIONPART ICLASSIC PAPERS1. Gordon Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’2. Anne O. Krueger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking society’3. Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’4. James M. Buchanan (1980), ‘Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking’5. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1982), ‘Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities’6. Robert D. Tollison (1982), ‘Rent Seeking: A Survey’7. Roger Congleton (1980), ‘Competitive Procedd, Competitive Waste, and Institutions’PART IIRENT SEEKING IN THE LONG RUN8. Gordon Tullock (1980), ‘Efficient Rent Seeking’9. William J. Corcoran (1984), ‘Long-run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-seeking’10. Richard S. Higgins, William F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison (1985), ‘Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking’11. Gordon Tullock (1985), ‘Back to the Bog’12. Bruce G. Linster (1993), ‘Stackelberg Rent-seeking’13. William R. Doudan and James M. Snyder (1993), ‘Are Rents Fully Dissipated?’PART IIIREFINEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS OF THE THEORY OF RENT SEEKING14. Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock and Leslie Young (1989), ‘Black Hole Tariffs’15. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Richard A. Brecher and T. N. Srinivasan (1984), ‘DUP Activities and Economic Theeory’16. Ayre L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz (1984), ‘Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power’17. Ngo Van Long and neil Vousden (1987), ‘Risk-Averse Rent Seeking with Shared Rents’18. Roger D. Congleton (1991), ‘Ideological Conviction and Persuasion in the Rent-seeking Society’PART IVCONTRIBUTIONS TO MEASUREMENT AND APPLICATION19. James M. Buchanen (1980), ‘Rent Seeking under External Diseconomies’20. Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1991), ‘The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth’21. David W. Laband and John PO. Sophocleus (1992), ‘An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on Transfer Acitivity in the United States’22. Richard S. Higgins and Robert D. Tollison (1988), ‘Life Amongst the Triangles and Trapezoids: Notes on the Theory of Rent-Seeking’23. Roger D. Congleton (1988), ‘Evaluating Rent-seeking Losses: Do the Welfare Gains of Lobbyists Count?’24. James M. Buchanen (1980), ‘Reform in the Rent-Seeking Society’25. Robert D. Tollison and Richard E. Wagner (1991), ‘Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform’