Does Perception Have Content?

Inbunden, Engelska, 2014

Av BROGAARD, Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri St Louis) Brogaard, Berit (Associate Professor, Associate Professor

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Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of perception, the question of whether perception has content in the first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have questioned this claim. The issue immediately raises a number of related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments? Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracy conditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address these and other central questions in the philosophy of perception.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2014-10-23
Mått236 x 155 x 33 mm
Vikt635 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SeriePhilosophy of Mind Series
Antal sidor392
FörlagOUP USA
ISBN9780199756018

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1. Introduction: Does Perception Have Content? ; Berit Brogaard ; Part I: Content Views ; 2. Bence Nanay: Empirical Problems with Anti-Representationalism ; 3. Susanna Siegel: Affordances and the Contents of Perception ; 4. Kathrin Gluer: Looks, Reasons and Experiences ; Part II: Against Strong Content ; 5. Charles Travis: The Preserve of Thinkers ; 6. Diana Raffman: Disjunctivism and the Alleged Nontransitivity of Indiscriminability ; Part III: Reconciliatory Views ; 7. Susanna Schellenberg: The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience ; 8. Heather Logue: Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation ; 9. Benj Hellie: On which perceptual phenomena have content and why they have it ; Part IV: Imagistic and Possible-Word Content ; 10. Mohan Matthen: Image Content ; 11. Michael Tye: What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? ; Part V: The Constituents of Perceptual Content and the Role of Perception ; 12. Bill Lycan: What Does Vision Represent? ; 13. Terry Horgan: Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color ; 14. Tomasz Budek and Katalin Farkas: Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience.