This book addresses the problems of administrative reform in Third World countries by examining recent reform efforts in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela. Dr. Hammergren discusses the politics of administrative change and the interaction of the political and technical dimensions of reform in the three countries. The failure of many reform programs, she suggests, can be traced to their conception primarily in technical terms; the neglect of the political dimension encourages a division between the interests dominating the technical, planning stages and the groups needed for implementation. In the case of Third World programs, this division is further aggravated by the impact of external actors on the power base and orientation of national reform planners. While international support helped establish reform programs in the three countries studied, it also dissuaded planners from building ties with other national groups and from broadening and intensifying their political bases. Dr. Hammergren explores the sources of program content in the case studies and the notion of reform success or failure and examines alternative strategies for designing reform programs. Her emphasis is on identifying political, programmatic, and organizational variables that can be manipulated to enhance program implementation and effectiveness.

This book addresses the problems of administrative reform in Third World countries by examining recent reform efforts in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela. Dr. Hammergren discusses the politics of administrative change and the interaction of the political and technical dimensions of reform in the three countries. The failure of many reform programs, she suggests, can be traced to their conception primarily in technical terms; the neglect of the political dimension encourages a division between the interests dominating the technical, planning stages and the groups needed for implementation. In the case of Third World programs, this division is further aggravated by the impact of external actors on the power base and orientation of national reform planners. While international support helped establish reform programs in the three countries studied, it also dissuaded planners from building ties with other national groups and from broadening and intensifying their political bases. Dr. Hammergren explores the sources of program content in the case studies and the notion of reform success or failure and examines alternative strategies for designing reform programs. Her emphasis is on identifying political, programmatic, and organizational variables that can be manipulated to enhance program implementation and effectiveness.

This book addresses the problems of administrative reform in Third World countries by examining recent reform efforts in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela. Dr. Hammergren discusses the politics of administrative change and the interaction of the political and technical dimensions of reform in the three countries. The failure of many reform programs, she suggests, can be traced to their conception primarily in technical terms; the neglect of the political dimension encourages a division between the interests dominating the technical, planning stages and the groups needed for implementation. In the case of Third World programs, this division is further aggravated by the impact of external actors on the power base and orientation of national reform planners. While international support helped establish reform programs in the three countries studied, it also dissuaded planners from building ties with other national groups and from broadening and intensifying their political bases. Dr. Hammergren explores the sources of program content in the case studies and the notion of reform success or failure and examines alternative strategies for designing reform programs. Her emphasis is on identifying political, programmatic, and organizational variables that can be manipulated to enhance program implementation and effectiveness.