Brian K. Grodsky is a former U.S. diplomat and reporter, and current professor of comparative and international politics at University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He is also a practitioner in the disaster sphere, having worked for more than two decades on local and national fire, rescue, and emergency medical teams. His three most recent books, The Democratization Disconnect, Social Movements and the New State, and The Costs of Justice, all explore challenges in democratizing states.

• PrefaceAcknowledgementsChapter 1: Power, Populism, and Policy in the Face of DangerChapter 2: The Perils and Promises of PopulismChapter 3: Populist Face COVID-19: The First Year of the Pandemic in China, Russia, and the United StatesChapter 4: The Advantages of Populist Authoritarianism? China’s COVID FightChapter 5: Populists Stuck in the Middle: How Russia Struggled to Control COVIDChapter 6: The United States: The Abyss of Democratic PopulismChapter 7: Beyond the Cases: Populism, COVID, and the Broader WorldBibliographyAbout the Author

Citizens of the world are increasingly exposed to a range of disasters. What type of institutional arrangements and governing styles are best suited to address them? In The Democracy Disadvantage, Brian K. Grodsky challenges the conventional thinking that democracies can better mitigate the human toll of disasters and that populists are doomed to fail in this regard. Rather, Grodsky combines these two dimensions into a compelling proposition: populists undercut the presumed advantage of democratic institutions but overcome authoritarian regimes’ putative deficiencies. Undergirding this argument is a theory of power and time. Disasters encourage populists in democracies to pursue quick, but sup-optimal, fixes because they lack both the power and the time to get it right. Yet for autocrats with power and time on their side, disasters provide a jolt that spurs public policies to benefit a broad swath of the citizenry. In-depth case studies of the incumbent leaders in the United States, China, and Russia during the COVID-19 pandemic probe the plausibility of these claims. The result is a significant contribution to our understanding of the politics of disasters. The Democracy Disadvantage gives theoreticians and students alike much to consider.

Brian K. Grodsky is a former U.S. diplomat and reporter, and current professor of comparative and international politics at University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He is also a practitioner in the disaster sphere, having worked for more than two decades on local and national fire, rescue, and emergency medical teams. His three most recent books, The Democratization Disconnect, Social Movements and the New State, and The Costs of Justice, all explore challenges in democratizing states.

• PrefaceAcknowledgementsChapter 1: Power, Populism, and Policy in the Face of DangerChapter 2: The Perils and Promises of PopulismChapter 3: Populist Face COVID-19: The First Year of the Pandemic in China, Russia, and the United StatesChapter 4: The Advantages of Populist Authoritarianism? China’s COVID FightChapter 5: Populists Stuck in the Middle: How Russia Struggled to Control COVIDChapter 6: The United States: The Abyss of Democratic PopulismChapter 7: Beyond the Cases: Populism, COVID, and the Broader WorldBibliographyAbout the Author

Citizens of the world are increasingly exposed to a range of disasters. What type of institutional arrangements and governing styles are best suited to address them? In The Democracy Disadvantage, Brian K. Grodsky challenges the conventional thinking that democracies can better mitigate the human toll of disasters and that populists are doomed to fail in this regard. Rather, Grodsky combines these two dimensions into a compelling proposition: populists undercut the presumed advantage of democratic institutions but overcome authoritarian regimes’ putative deficiencies. Undergirding this argument is a theory of power and time. Disasters encourage populists in democracies to pursue quick, but sup-optimal, fixes because they lack both the power and the time to get it right. Yet for autocrats with power and time on their side, disasters provide a jolt that spurs public policies to benefit a broad swath of the citizenry. In-depth case studies of the incumbent leaders in the United States, China, and Russia during the COVID-19 pandemic probe the plausibility of these claims. The result is a significant contribution to our understanding of the politics of disasters. The Democracy Disadvantage gives theoreticians and students alike much to consider.

Brian K. Grodsky is a former U.S. diplomat and reporter, and current professor of comparative and international politics at University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He is also a practitioner in the disaster sphere, having worked for more than two decades on local and national fire, rescue, and emergency medical teams. His three most recent books, The Democratization Disconnect, Social Movements and the New State, and The Costs of Justice, all explore challenges in democratizing states.

• PrefaceAcknowledgementsChapter 1: Power, Populism, and Policy in the Face of DangerChapter 2: The Perils and Promises of PopulismChapter 3: Populist Face COVID-19: The First Year of the Pandemic in China, Russia, and the United StatesChapter 4: The Advantages of Populist Authoritarianism? China’s COVID FightChapter 5: Populists Stuck in the Middle: How Russia Struggled to Control COVIDChapter 6: The United States: The Abyss of Democratic PopulismChapter 7: Beyond the Cases: Populism, COVID, and the Broader WorldBibliographyAbout the Author

Citizens of the world are increasingly exposed to a range of disasters. What type of institutional arrangements and governing styles are best suited to address them? In The Democracy Disadvantage, Brian K. Grodsky challenges the conventional thinking that democracies can better mitigate the human toll of disasters and that populists are doomed to fail in this regard. Rather, Grodsky combines these two dimensions into a compelling proposition: populists undercut the presumed advantage of democratic institutions but overcome authoritarian regimes’ putative deficiencies. Undergirding this argument is a theory of power and time. Disasters encourage populists in democracies to pursue quick, but sup-optimal, fixes because they lack both the power and the time to get it right. Yet for autocrats with power and time on their side, disasters provide a jolt that spurs public policies to benefit a broad swath of the citizenry. In-depth case studies of the incumbent leaders in the United States, China, and Russia during the COVID-19 pandemic probe the plausibility of these claims. The result is a significant contribution to our understanding of the politics of disasters. The Democracy Disadvantage gives theoreticians and students alike much to consider.