Del i serien British School at Athens - Modern Greek and Byzantine Studies

Cyprus Conflict

Diplomacy as Dissent, 1954–1974

Inbunden, Engelska, 2026

3 089 kr

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While the Cyprus conflict is often framed as an insular communal tragedy or as the mechanical outcome of competing nationalisms, this study offers a more exacting reconstruction. Attentive to the plurality of forces shaping the conflict, it shows how the island functioned as a critical hinge in Greek–Turkish relations. Cyprus amplified insecurities, reordered strategic priorities, and transformed a localized dispute into a persistent bilateral fault line. It thus emerges not as an isolated anomaly, but as a catalyst whose reverberations have reshaped the regional equilibrium into the present. The book’s central contribution is a rigorously revisionist account of Greek policy-making. Kalpadakis demonstrates that alongside dominant irredentist narratives existed a coherent, strategically literate diplomatic current that interpreted Cyprus through its long-term implications for Greek–Turkish relations. Drawing on extensive archival research, the study traces this dissenting diplomacy from the decolonization debates of the 1950s through the constitutional crisis of the 1960s and into the years preceding 1974. These pragmatists endorsed Cypriot self-determination but resisted the absolutization of immediate Enosis, recognizing how Cyprus could entrench asymmetries, internationalize bilateral antagonism, and expose wider Greek interests to retaliation. Analytically disciplined and conceptually ambitious, The Cyprus Conflict: Diplomacy as Dissent, 1954-1974 is essential reading for scholars of the Cyprus conflict, Greek–Turkish relations, nationalism, and Cold War diplomacy. By situating Cyprus within the wider logic of bilateral relations and recovering neglected traditions of strategic reasoning, while restoring contingency to a conflict too often framed through retrospective inevitability, the book illuminates deep-seated patterns of constraint, escalation, and choice. It thus offers not only a historical reinterpretation, but a policy-relevant framework for understanding the enduring strategic dilemmas of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2026-10-05
Mått156 x 234 x undefined mm
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieBritish School at Athens - Modern Greek and Byzantine Studies
Antal sidor334
FörlagTaylor & Francis Ltd
ISBN9781041051312

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George Kalpadakis is a Senior Researcher at the Academy of Athens, Greece. He has been a Lewis–Gibson Visiting Fellow at the University of Cambridge, a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Cambridge, as well as Visiting Professor at the University of Vienna. His publications include The Macedonian dispute, 1962–1995 (3rd ed. 2012; Academy of Athens Award 2013) and Une confédération des Balkans (2026). He studied at University College London, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the University of Athens, where he was awarded his PhD with Distinction in 2009.

Foreword by Professor Paschalis M. KitromilidesAcknowledgements Introduction: ‘An evolutionary path, with self-government as a first step’PART ONE – SETTING THE STAGEChapter 1 – Greek-Turkish relations1.1 Turkish revisionism1.2 Greek communities of Turkey1.3 Ecumenical Patriarchate of ConstantinopleChapter 2 – Smoke signals2.1 The British factor2.2 General Consulate of Nicosia2.3 Return of the EthnarchChapter 3 – Foundering3.1 A new Governor3.2 The ascendant Turkish factorPART TWO – FROM INDEPENDENCE TO PARTITIONChapter 4 – The ‘ill-fated’ thirteen points4.1 ‘Salvaging the shipwreck’4.2 Collapse of the Zurich constitutional order4.3 Turkish Cypriot enclavesChapter 5 – The dissenting pragmatists5.1 Diplomatic tensions5.2 Quest for settlement5.3 The Turkish invasionPART THREE – FACETS OF GREECE’S CYPRUS POLICYChapter 6 – A bifurcated strategy6.1 The dual-track policy6.2 Cold War ideologies6.3 RelapseChapter 7 – Deligiannism and judicious adaptations7.1 The case of Seferiades7.2 Battlefront mentality7.3 Institutional counterpointsConclusion: Diplomacy as dissentAppendicesI. ‘The Cyprus issue and Turkey’ (1958) [V. Mostras]II. ‘Enlightening the British about the Cyprus issue’ (1956) [V. Mostras]III. ‘National defiance’ (1976) [A.S. Vlachos]BibliographyIndex

‘Kalpadakis deploys detailed and subtle arguments to re-examine the diplomatic exchanges and political manoeuvres that took place during the twenty-year period leading up to the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, with particular attention to the shifting role of the Government of Greece. I have no doubt that it will become a standard work on the diplomatic background to this turbulent period of the island’s history’ - David Holton, Professor Emeritus, University of Cambridge, UK.‘We are in the author’s debt for offering such a reflective and instructive work to all those concerned with the serious study of the Cyprus Question. Kalpadakis’ study emerges not only as a diplomatic history of Cyprus but as a reflection on the conditions under which political communities reconcile aspiration with limitation, and passion with judgment. It stands, gently but unmistakably, as a work of policy-relevant history’ - Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Academy of Athens and Professor Emeritus, University of Athens, Greece.‘Tools exist for turning tragedy into wisdom: one of those is this masterful synthesis on the Cyprus question. Having mined unpublished or neglected archives to brilliant effect, it excels in the clarity with which it frames policy debates using the exchanges of Greek diplomats and politicians’ - Brady Kiesling, Former U.S. diplomat and author of Diplomacy Lessons.‘This important study draws on a rich archival base and marshals it into an original, cogent account. Kalpadakis details how pragmatic voices were sidelined at critical junctures — sacrificed, time and again, on the altar of what George Theotokas memorably termed Greece's "perennial Deligiannism" — a pattern that played directly into Ankara's revisionist ambitions, culminating in the tragic invasion in 1974’ - Nicos Mouzelis, Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), UK.