Corporate Reputation and Social Activism

Strategic Interaction, Firm Behavior, and Social Welfare

Inbunden, Engelska, 2019

Av Jose Muguel Abito, David Besanko, Daniel Diermeier, University of Pennsylvania) Abito, Jose Muguel (Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, The Wharton School, Northwestern University) Besanko, David (Alvin Huss Professor of Management and Strategy, Alvin Huss Professor of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) Diermeier, Daniel (IBM Professor of Regulation and Competitive Practice and Director, IBM Professor of Regulation and Competitive Practice and Director, Ford Motor Company Center for Global Citizenship, Kellogg School of Management

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A firm's reputation is an asset that can be built or harmed over time and most companies invest in their good standing. This can be challenged or threatened by activists seeking to change the firm's behavior, especially to reduce negative externalities and other social harms that a company may be creating. The strategic interaction takes place in the realm of private politics and corporate social responsibility-perceptions and actions of the company, activists, and the public audience-rather than that of public policy, including regulation. In Corporate Reptutation and Social Activism Jose Miguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel Diermeier argue that harm to a firm's reputation is one of the strongest and most practical tools of contemporary corporate activism and explains the numerous campaigns as well as the response of companies. Through a straightforward dynamic model focusing on the interaction of the firm and activists, the authors show how both the firm's existing reputation and various activist tactics influence actions and outcomes of both the firm and the activists. Among their insights are that as a firm's reputation grows, it tends to coast on its reputation by reducing its private regulation, or voluntary adoption of internal rules that constrain certain company behavior. Activists can keep the firm from coasting in two ways: the firm acts more responsibly to protect its reputation in anticipation of activist campaigns, and a firm whose reputation is harmed by a campaign engages more responsibly to repair its reputation.The book explores how activists choose among potential targets and the different tactics activists can use to harm firms' reputations, including criticism, which has a potentially mild impact on the firm's reputation, confrontation, which can cause a reputational crisis in which the firm's reputation can be dramatically impaired, and rewards, which increase a firm's reputation. These can have different effects on firm behavior. The authors also examine whether campaigns by activists advance or harm social welfare. The result is a sweeping overview of an evolving and increasingly important phenomenon that combines rigorous modeling and that generates a rich set of empirical implications that will interest researchers in economics, business and management, sociology, and political science.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2019-10-16
Mått239 x 157 x 22 mm
Vikt544 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor264
FörlagOUP USA
ISBN9780199386154

Tillhör följande kategorier

Politisk aktivism inom Samhalle och politik
Affärsetik inom Ekonomi och ledarskap
Affärsförhandlingar inom Ekonomi och ledarskap

Jose Miguel Abito is Assistant Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.David Besanko is IBM Professor of Regulation & Competitive Practices at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. His work has appeared in the Econometrica, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, RAND Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Law and Economics.Daniel Diermeier serves as the thirteenth Provost of the University of Chicago, where he is the David Lee Shillinglaw Distinguished Service Professor at the Harris School Public Policy and the College. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Canadian Institute of Advanced Research (CIFAR).

1 An Introduction to Corporate Campaigns 1.1 Corporate campaigns1.2 Firm strategies1.3 The consequences of corporate campaigns1.4 Private politics and corporate social responsibility1.5 Overview 2 A Dynamic Model of Corporate Campaigns 2.1 The model2.2 Equilibrium analysis 2.3 Empirical implications2.4 Conclusions2.5 Appendix to Chapter 23 Campaign Tactics 3.1 The model 3.2 Equilibrium analysis: preliminaries3.3 Computational approach 3.4 Equilibrium analysis: characterization of equilibrium3.5 Rewards as a campaign tactic 3.6 Empirical Implications3.7 Conclusions3.8 Appendix to Chapter 34 Do Activist Campaigns Bene.t Society? 4.1 The welfare economics of campaigns4.2 Applications of model insights4.3 Is passion socially valuable?4.4 Conclusions4.5 Appendix to Chapter 45 Target Selection by Activists and the Structure of Competition5.1 Model set-up and preliminary analysis5.2 Targeting firms in different industries5.3 Targeting firms in the same industry5.4 Industry-wide campaigns or firm-speci.c campaigns?5.5 Empirical Implications5.6 Appendix to Chapter 56 Conclusions: What Have We Learned? 6.1 Summary6.2 Lessons for scholars and practitioners6.3 Where do we go from here?

Abito, Besanko, and Diermeier have produced a masterful study of firms facing challenges to their reputations by social activists seeking to induce greater corporate social responsibility and self-regulation.The study is based on formal, dynamic theory and computational economics that reveal intriguing insights into firm and activist strategies, including reputation management, campaign intensity, and target selection.