Natalie Mrockova is Researcher and Lecturer at Merton College and Law and Finance Associate at the China Centre, University of Oxford.

• 1. Introduction 1.1. Theoretical Framework: Economic Analysis of Law 1.2. Why Bankruptcy Law Matters 1.3. Methodology 1.4. Structure of the Book PART IBACKGROUND2. China’s Socio-Economic, Political and Legal Environment 2.1. Economic and Political Transformation of China 2.2. Power and the Party-State 2.3. Laws and Rules in China 2.4. Courts, the Party-State and Limited Law Enforcement in China 2.5. Corporate Ownership and Control in China 3. Debt Finance and Enforcement in China 3.1. Debt Finance in China 3.2. Companies’ Access to Credit in China 3.3. Debt Enforcement Mechanisms in China 3.4. General Challenges to Debt Enforcement in China PART IITHE EBL AND ITS PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS4. Bankruptcy Law in China 4.1. History of Bankruptcy Law in China 4.2. Black-letter Overview of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 4.3. Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretations and Judicial Cases 4.4. Personal Bankruptcy Law 5. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 and its Causes 5.1. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 5.2. Reasons for the Limited Use of the EBL – The Four ‘Constraints’ 6. The First Constraint – Creditors and Debtors Feel Insufficiently Protected under the EBL 6.1. Implications of Courts’ Duties to Protect Employees 6.2. Heightened Threat of Scrutiny and Liability under the EBL 6.3. Insolvency as De Facto Entry Requirement for Reorganisation 7. The Second Constraint – Reduced Recoveries under the EBL 7.1. General Flaws in Debt Enforcement that Negatively Affect Recoveries under the EBL 7.2. Shortcomings that Specifically Affect EBL Enforcement 7.3. The EBL not Viable for Certain Types of Debt Contracts 8. The Third Constraint – Limitations and Biases of EBL Enforcers 8.1. Courts’ and Lawyers’ Internal Limitations 8.2. Administrators’ Passivity 8.3. The Party-state’s Influence over Court Enforcement of the EBL 9. The Fourth Constraint – Non-EBL Debt Enforcement Mechanisms 9.1. Private Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages 9.2. Politically Driven Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages PART IIIDESIRABILITY AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM10. Desirability of Reforming Bankruptcy Law in China 10.1. Is a Greater Use of Bankruptcy Law in China Desirable? 10.2. Benefits of Greater Use of (Reformed) EBL 10.3. Nature of Further Reform 11. Options for Reform 11.1. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Provisions 11.2. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Enforcement Practices and Surrounding Rules 11.3. Reforms Aimed at EBL Enforcers 12. Recent Reform Initiatives 2015–20 12.1. What Set Off Recent Bankruptcy Law Reform? 12.2. Summary of Key Reforms 2015–20 12.3. Reform 1: Encourage Greater Use of the EBL – Resolving Zombie Companies 12.4. Reform 2: Specialised Bankruptcy Courts and Administrator Associations 12.5. Reform 3: EBL Platform 12.6. Reform 4: Judicial and Political Guidance 12.7. Reform 5: Local Conferences and Experience-sharing Events 12.8. Reform 6: Simplified EBL Procedure 12.9. Reform 7: Personal Bankruptcy 12.10. Reform 8: Bankruptcy Assistance Fund 12.11. Reform 9: Judges’ Evaluation System for Resolving EBL Cases 12.12. Reform 10: Cooperation with Local Party-state 12.13. The Future PART IVFOREIGN STAKEHOLDERS AND THE EBL13. The Role of Foreign Parties in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China 13.1. Foreign Influence in the Making of the EBL 13.2. Rules and Guidance that Govern Cross-border Bankruptcies in China 13.3. Foreign Stakeholders in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China Conclusion

This is an excellent book comprehensively examining the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law and investigating not only the law on the books but also the law in action. The most valuable contribution of this book is that many arguments rely on the firsthand data, both quantitative and qualitative, meticulously collected from official sources and fieldwork interviews. This evidence-based approach, deployed throughout the book, makes the analysis considerably insightful.

Natalie Mrockova is Researcher and Lecturer at Merton College and Law and Finance Associate at the China Centre, University of Oxford.

• 1. Introduction 1.1. Theoretical Framework: Economic Analysis of Law 1.2. Why Bankruptcy Law Matters 1.3. Methodology 1.4. Structure of the Book PART IBACKGROUND2. China’s Socio-Economic, Political and Legal Environment 2.1. Economic and Political Transformation of China 2.2. Power and the Party-State 2.3. Laws and Rules in China 2.4. Courts, the Party-State and Limited Law Enforcement in China 2.5. Corporate Ownership and Control in China 3. Debt Finance and Enforcement in China 3.1. Debt Finance in China 3.2. Companies’ Access to Credit in China 3.3. Debt Enforcement Mechanisms in China 3.4. General Challenges to Debt Enforcement in China PART IITHE EBL AND ITS PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS4. Bankruptcy Law in China 4.1. History of Bankruptcy Law in China 4.2. Black-letter Overview of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 4.3. Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretations and Judicial Cases 4.4. Personal Bankruptcy Law 5. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 and its Causes 5.1. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 5.2. Reasons for the Limited Use of the EBL – The Four ‘Constraints’ 6. The First Constraint – Creditors and Debtors Feel Insufficiently Protected under the EBL 6.1. Implications of Courts’ Duties to Protect Employees 6.2. Heightened Threat of Scrutiny and Liability under the EBL 6.3. Insolvency as De Facto Entry Requirement for Reorganisation 7. The Second Constraint – Reduced Recoveries under the EBL 7.1. General Flaws in Debt Enforcement that Negatively Affect Recoveries under the EBL 7.2. Shortcomings that Specifically Affect EBL Enforcement 7.3. The EBL not Viable for Certain Types of Debt Contracts 8. The Third Constraint – Limitations and Biases of EBL Enforcers 8.1. Courts’ and Lawyers’ Internal Limitations 8.2. Administrators’ Passivity 8.3. The Party-state’s Influence over Court Enforcement of the EBL 9. The Fourth Constraint – Non-EBL Debt Enforcement Mechanisms 9.1. Private Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages 9.2. Politically Driven Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages PART IIIDESIRABILITY AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM10. Desirability of Reforming Bankruptcy Law in China 10.1. Is a Greater Use of Bankruptcy Law in China Desirable? 10.2. Benefits of Greater Use of (Reformed) EBL 10.3. Nature of Further Reform 11. Options for Reform 11.1. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Provisions 11.2. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Enforcement Practices and Surrounding Rules 11.3. Reforms Aimed at EBL Enforcers 12. Recent Reform Initiatives 2015–20 12.1. What Set Off Recent Bankruptcy Law Reform? 12.2. Summary of Key Reforms 2015–20 12.3. Reform 1: Encourage Greater Use of the EBL – Resolving Zombie Companies 12.4. Reform 2: Specialised Bankruptcy Courts and Administrator Associations 12.5. Reform 3: EBL Platform 12.6. Reform 4: Judicial and Political Guidance 12.7. Reform 5: Local Conferences and Experience-sharing Events 12.8. Reform 6: Simplified EBL Procedure 12.9. Reform 7: Personal Bankruptcy 12.10. Reform 8: Bankruptcy Assistance Fund 12.11. Reform 9: Judges’ Evaluation System for Resolving EBL Cases 12.12. Reform 10: Cooperation with Local Party-state 12.13. The Future PART IVFOREIGN STAKEHOLDERS AND THE EBL13. The Role of Foreign Parties in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China 13.1. Foreign Influence in the Making of the EBL 13.2. Rules and Guidance that Govern Cross-border Bankruptcies in China 13.3. Foreign Stakeholders in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China Conclusion

This is an excellent book comprehensively examining the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law and investigating not only the law on the books but also the law in action. The most valuable contribution of this book is that many arguments rely on the firsthand data, both quantitative and qualitative, meticulously collected from official sources and fieldwork interviews. This evidence-based approach, deployed throughout the book, makes the analysis considerably insightful.

Natalie Mrockova is Researcher and Lecturer at Merton College and Law and Finance Associate at the China Centre, University of Oxford.

• 1. Introduction 1.1. Theoretical Framework: Economic Analysis of Law 1.2. Why Bankruptcy Law Matters 1.3. Methodology 1.4. Structure of the Book PART IBACKGROUND2. China’s Socio-Economic, Political and Legal Environment 2.1. Economic and Political Transformation of China 2.2. Power and the Party-State 2.3. Laws and Rules in China 2.4. Courts, the Party-State and Limited Law Enforcement in China 2.5. Corporate Ownership and Control in China 3. Debt Finance and Enforcement in China 3.1. Debt Finance in China 3.2. Companies’ Access to Credit in China 3.3. Debt Enforcement Mechanisms in China 3.4. General Challenges to Debt Enforcement in China PART IITHE EBL AND ITS PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS4. Bankruptcy Law in China 4.1. History of Bankruptcy Law in China 4.2. Black-letter Overview of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 4.3. Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretations and Judicial Cases 4.4. Personal Bankruptcy Law 5. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 and its Causes 5.1. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 5.2. Reasons for the Limited Use of the EBL – The Four ‘Constraints’ 6. The First Constraint – Creditors and Debtors Feel Insufficiently Protected under the EBL 6.1. Implications of Courts’ Duties to Protect Employees 6.2. Heightened Threat of Scrutiny and Liability under the EBL 6.3. Insolvency as De Facto Entry Requirement for Reorganisation 7. The Second Constraint – Reduced Recoveries under the EBL 7.1. General Flaws in Debt Enforcement that Negatively Affect Recoveries under the EBL 7.2. Shortcomings that Specifically Affect EBL Enforcement 7.3. The EBL not Viable for Certain Types of Debt Contracts 8. The Third Constraint – Limitations and Biases of EBL Enforcers 8.1. Courts’ and Lawyers’ Internal Limitations 8.2. Administrators’ Passivity 8.3. The Party-state’s Influence over Court Enforcement of the EBL 9. The Fourth Constraint – Non-EBL Debt Enforcement Mechanisms 9.1. Private Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages 9.2. Politically Driven Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages PART IIIDESIRABILITY AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM10. Desirability of Reforming Bankruptcy Law in China 10.1. Is a Greater Use of Bankruptcy Law in China Desirable? 10.2. Benefits of Greater Use of (Reformed) EBL 10.3. Nature of Further Reform 11. Options for Reform 11.1. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Provisions 11.2. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Enforcement Practices and Surrounding Rules 11.3. Reforms Aimed at EBL Enforcers 12. Recent Reform Initiatives 2015–20 12.1. What Set Off Recent Bankruptcy Law Reform? 12.2. Summary of Key Reforms 2015–20 12.3. Reform 1: Encourage Greater Use of the EBL – Resolving Zombie Companies 12.4. Reform 2: Specialised Bankruptcy Courts and Administrator Associations 12.5. Reform 3: EBL Platform 12.6. Reform 4: Judicial and Political Guidance 12.7. Reform 5: Local Conferences and Experience-sharing Events 12.8. Reform 6: Simplified EBL Procedure 12.9. Reform 7: Personal Bankruptcy 12.10. Reform 8: Bankruptcy Assistance Fund 12.11. Reform 9: Judges’ Evaluation System for Resolving EBL Cases 12.12. Reform 10: Cooperation with Local Party-state 12.13. The Future PART IVFOREIGN STAKEHOLDERS AND THE EBL13. The Role of Foreign Parties in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China 13.1. Foreign Influence in the Making of the EBL 13.2. Rules and Guidance that Govern Cross-border Bankruptcies in China 13.3. Foreign Stakeholders in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China Conclusion

This is an excellent book comprehensively examining the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law and investigating not only the law on the books but also the law in action. The most valuable contribution of this book is that many arguments rely on the firsthand data, both quantitative and qualitative, meticulously collected from official sources and fieldwork interviews. This evidence-based approach, deployed throughout the book, makes the analysis considerably insightful.