Contributions to Insurance Economics

Inbunden, Engelska, 1992

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This book offers a basic reference, new material and teaching supplements to graduate students and researchers in economics, finance and insurance. The book is divided into two main parts. Part 1 contains six survey articles on different subjects that represent significant developments over the past years: optimality of insurance contracting, liability insurance, moral hazard, adverse selection, insurance pricing and econometric estimation of accident distributions. Part 2 extends the recent literature by presenting fourteen essays one different subjects of current research in: (a) the theory of insurance economics covering nonlinear expected utility, prudence, deviant beliefs, incomplete markets, increases in risk, ambiguity; (b) problems of information including moral hazard and competitive markets, adverse selection and probationary periods, incomplete information and risk categorization, and (c) empirical studies on workers' compensation, adverse selection and the effects of no-fault in automobile insurance. Each paper is presented with an abstract and keywords, and can be read independently of the other contributions in the volume.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1992-04-30
Mått210 x 297 x 34 mm
Vikt980 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieHuebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security
Antal sidor524
Upplaga1992
FörlagKluwer Academic Publishers
ISBN9780792391753

Tillhör följande kategorier

Privatekonomi inom Ekonomi och ledarskap
Mikroekonomi inom Ekonomi och ledarskap
Finansiering inom Ekonomi och ledarskap
Ledarskap och motivation inom Ekonomi och ledarskap
Företagsekonomi inom Ekonomi och ledarskap

Economic Theory of Risk Exchanges: A Review.- The Demand for and Supply of Liability Insurance.- Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts.- Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey.- Financial Pricing of Property and Liability Insurance.- Econometric Models of Accident Distributions.- Optimal Insurance: A Nonexpected Utility Analysis.- Background Risk, Prudence, and the Demand for Insurance.- Optimum Insurance with Deviant Beliefs.- Increases in Risk and the Demand for Insurance.- Crop Insurance in Incomplete Markets.- How Does Ambiguity Affect Insurance Decisions?.- Moral Hazard and Competitive Insurance Markets.- Probationary Periods and Time-Dependent Deductibles in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection.- Insurance Classifications and Social Welfare.- Social Insurance in Market Contexts: Implications of the Structure of Workers’ Compensation for Job Safety and Wages.- Testing for Asymmetric Information in Canadian Automobile Insurance.- Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Insurance Claim Data.- Measuring the Effects of the No-Fault 1978 Quebec Automobile Insurance Act with the DRAG Model.- Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis of the Experience in Quebec.