Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

Christopher Hitchcock is Professor of Philosophy at the California Institute of Technology. His articles have appeared in journals such as The Philosophical Review, The Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, Philosophy of Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, and Synthese.

• Notes on Contributors PrefaceIntroduction: What is the Philosophy of Science?Part I: Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism?1. Why Thought Experiments Transcend EmpiricismJames Robert Brown, University of Toronto2. Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend EmpiricismJohn Norton, University of PittsburghPart II: Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or Justification?3. Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific ConfirmationPatrick Maher, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign4. Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Scientific JustificationKevin Kelly, Carnegie Mellon University and Clark Glymour, Carnegie Mellon UniversityPart III: Can a Theory's Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates?5. A Theory's Predictive Success Can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it PostulatesJarrett Leplin, University of North Carolina, Greensboro6. A Theory's Predictive Success Does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it PostulatesAndré Kukla, University of Toronto and Joel Walmsley, University of TorontoPart IV: Are There Laws in the Social Sciences?7. There are no Laws in the Social SciencesJohn Roberts, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill8. There are Laws in the Social SciencesHarold Kincaid, University of Alabama at BirminghamPart V: Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects?9. Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not CausesPhil Dowe, University of Queensland, Australia10. Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative CausationJonathan Schaffer, University of Massachusetts, AmherstPart VI: Is There a Puzzle about the Low Entropy Past?11. On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why There is Still a Puzzle About the Low Entropy PastHuw Price, University of Edinburgh12. There is No Puzzle About the Low Entropy PastCraig CallenderPart VII: Do Genes Encode Information About Phenotypic Traits13. Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic TraitsSahotra Sarkar, University of Texas at Austin14. Genes Do not Encode Information for Phenotypic TraitsPeter Godfrey-Smith, Stanford UniversityPart VIII: Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection?15. The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural SelectionPeter Carruthers, University of Maryland16. The Mind is Not (Just) a System of Modules Shaped (Just) by Natural SelectionFiona Cowie, California Institute of Technology and James Woodward, California Institute of TechnologyIndex

"This book offers an excellent way into both general philosophy of science and the important foundational issues that are generated by particular special sciences. The contributions are of the highest quality, and range from the epistemology of thought-experiments to the relationship between genes and whole organisms. The pairing of essays defending opposing points of view shows readers that philosophy of science is full of live issues that demand scientifically well-informed and philosophically sophisticated debate." James Ladyman, University of Bristol "The essays in this invaluable collection are splendid and spirited, and they manage to encompass a broad range of the most exciting debates in philosophy of science today. By juxtaposing rival viewpoints on the same questions, this collection is sure to provoke vigorous responses from students and their teachers alike." Marc Lange, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill "The volume gives a real taste of current philosophical debate. The debated issues are real and well-defined, and not obscure conflicts of various -isms whose philosophical relevance is only understood by the participants." Petri Ylikoski, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies