Brian P. McLaughlin is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1988), editor of Dretske and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind.Jonathan Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.

• Notes on Contributors ixIntroductionJonathan Cohen xiiPART I MENTAL CONTENT 1Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 31 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude AttributionsGabriel Segal 52 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow ContentSarah Sawyer 20Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 353 Externalism and Privileged Access Are ConsistentAnthony Brueckner 374 Externalism and Privileged Access Are InconsistentMichael McKinsey 53Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 675 Resisting Normativism in PsychologyGeorges Rey 696 Normativism DefendedRalph Wedgwood 85Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 1037 The Revenge of the GivenJerry Fodor 1058 Are There Different Kinds of Content?Richard G. Heck Jr 117PART II PHYSICALISM 139Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 1419 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive MaterialismLouise Antony 14310 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative MaterialismPaul M. Churchland 160Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 18311 A Priori PhysicalismFrank Jackson 18512 On the Limits of A Priori PhysicalismBrian P. McLaughlin 200Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 22513 Causation and Mental CausationJaegwon Kim 22714 Mental Causation, or Something Near EnoughBarry Loewer 243PART III THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE 265Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 26715 Dualist EmergentismMartine Nida-Rümelin 26916 Against Ontologically Emergent ConsciousnessDavid Braddon-Mitchell 287Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 30117 New Troubles for the Qualia FreakMichael Tye 30318 A Case for QualiaSydney Shoemaker 319Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 33319 All Consciousness Is PerceptualJesse Prinz 33520 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)Christopher Peacocke 358Index 377

"The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentious issues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape and identifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that is thoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone with an interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind." (Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011) "This book gives the reader a vivid sense of the philosophy of mind as a living activity. The chapters of this book provide an excellent introduction to ongoing debates about consciousness, intentionality, and physicalism. At the same time, many of the chapters make important contributions to the subject in their own right."David Chalmers, Australian National University