Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

BRIAN P. MCLAUGHLIN is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He has published numerous papers in fields including philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He co-authored (with Vann McGee) Terrestrial Logic: Formal Semantics Brought Down to Earth (forthcoming, Oxford). JONATHAN COHEN is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. He is the author of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.

• Notes on Contributors ixIntroduction to the Second Edition Jonathan Cohen xiiiIntroduction to the First Edition Jonathan Cohen xviiiPart I Mental Content 1Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 31 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 52 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 19Is Externalism About Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 333 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 354 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 50Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 635 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 656 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 80Is There Non-conceptual Content? 977 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 998 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard Kimberly Heck 110Part II Physicalism 131Is Non-reductive Materialism Viable? 1339 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-reductive Materialism Louise Antony 13510 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 152Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 17311 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 17512 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 189Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 21313 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 21514 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 230Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 251Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 25315 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 25516 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 272Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 28517 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 28718 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 303Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 31719 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 31920 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 341Part IV Perception And Mental Capacities 359Should Perception Be Understood in Terms of Representation, Direct Contact with the World, or a Hybrid View? 36121 Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science Craig French and Ian Phillips 36322 Naïve Realism v. Representationalism: An Argument from Science Adam Pautz 38423 Capacities-First Philosophy Susanna Schellenberg 406Is Perception General, Particular, or a Hybrid? 43124 Perceiving Particulars Christopher S. Hill 43325 Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content: The Best of Both Theories Heather Logue 449How Should We Understand the Distinction Between Perception and Cognition? 46726 The Perception–Cognition Border: Architecture or Format? E. J. Green 46927 Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File Ned Block 494Is Pain a Natural Kind? 51728 Scientific Eliminativism for Pain Jennifer Corns 51929 Pain Is a Natural Kind Matthew Fulkerson 535Do We Need Imagination Over and Above Imagery and Supposition? 55130 Against Imagination Bence Nanay 55331 Why We Need Imagination Amy Kind 570Index 588