Constitutional Conflict as Judicial Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection

Geboren 1993; Studium der Rechtswissenschaft sowie der englischen und deutschen Philologie an der Universität Heidelberg und der University of Edinburgh; 2016 B.A., 2018 Erste Juristische Prüfung; 2019 MPhil in Theoretical and Applied Linguistics an der University of Cambridge; 2025 Promotion im Fach Rechtswissenschaft an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; 2025 Zweite Juristische Staatsprüfung (OLG Karlsruhe).

• IntroductionI. Irreconcilability as the starting point - II. Conscientious disobedience: Is there space for resistance in a democratic regime? - III. Conscientious disobedience and constitutional conflict in the European Union: Of underexplored parallels between two highly normative debates - IV. Exploring the potential of conscientious disobedience for constitutional conflict in the European Union in a more comprehensive manner - V. Aims and inherent limits of this reconceptualisation - VI. General structure - VII. On a technical noteA. Constitutional Conflict in the European Union after PSPPI. Introduction - II. Two irreconcilable visions of public authority in the European Union as the starting point - III. Constitutional pluralism as a response to irreconcilability - IV. Applying the language of legality & illegality to the different visions laid out - V. Chapter SummaryB. Conscientious DisobedienceI. Introduction - II. Civil disobedience - III. Conscientious objection - IV. Demarcating civil disobedience and conscientious objection - V. Readjusting the lens: Proposing an alternative understanding of conscientious disobedience as an intra-legal drama - VI. Chapter SummaryC. A Proposal for a Framework of Judicial Conscientious DisobedienceI. Introduction - II. Importing civil disobedience to the field of international and Union law - III. Proposing a framework of judicial conscientious disobedience - IV. Chapter SummaryD. Application to Selected Case LawI. The Solange saga as an instance of judicial civil disobedience - II. The Taricco saga as an instance of judicial conscientious objection - III. Ajos as an instance of judicial civil disobedience - IV. Rereading recent judgments by the Trybunał Konstytucyjny as instances of judicial civil disobedience? - V. Chapter SummaryConclusionI. Towards a novel understanding of conscientious disobedience - II. Applying the framework - results - III. Once again: Limits of the reconceptualisation - IV. Unresolved questions - possible future avenues for research - V. Constant negotiation ahead