Collective Decision-Making:

Social Choice and Political Economy

Häftad, Engelska, 2010

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This volume is intended to provide a broad perspective on collective decision-making, presenting economic and political aspects from both a theoretical and empirical viewpoint. The four chapters in the first section of the book give new results in Social Choice Theory, showing how the Arrow Impossibility Theorem applies in both economic and political decisions, and analyzing generalized Borda voting methods. The second section examines elections and committees, by setting up a formal approach to study the election of a legislature by presenting new experimental work on voting in committees, and by outlining a unified theory of political choice. The third section examines decision-making in multiparty politics (including detailed theoretical and empirical study of a number of democracies). The fourth section on political economy covers interest groups, electoral cycles and a formal discussion of the 'general will'. We need to understand all the properties of coalitions and coalition-formation in order to appreciate and interpret politics...This volume summarizes what we have learned. - from the Foreword by William Riker.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2010-12-07
Mått155 x 235 x 24 mm
Vikt668 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SerieRecent Economic Thought
Antal sidor422
FörlagSpringer
ISBN9789048158003

Tillhör följande kategorier

Statsvetenskap och politisk teori inom Samhalle och politik

1 Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation.- I. Social Choice.- 2 An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains.- 3 Social Ranking of Allocations with and without Coalition Formation.- 4 Non Binary Social Choice: A Brief Introduction.- 5 Election Relations and a Partial Ordering for Positional Voting.- II. Elections and Committees.- 6 Electing Legislatures.- 7 Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games.- 8 The Heart of a Polity.- 9 Refinements of the Heart.- III. Coalition Governments.- 10 Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan.- 11 An Analysis of the Euskarian Parliament.- 12 Extending a Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation.- 13 The Sequential Dynamics of Cabinet Formation, Stochastic Error, and a Test of Competing Models.- 14 Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation.- 15 The Costs of Coalition: The Italian Anomaly.- IV. Political Economy.- 16 Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches.- 17 Partisan Electoral Cycles and Monetary Policy Games.- 18 Hypothesis Testing and Collective Decision-Making.- 19 Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.- Name Index.

'The editor has selected carefully an excellent array of articles and organized them most effectively in a logical and coherent presentation of critical issues with social choice and political economy within the context of collective decision making. This is an excellent edited volume for readers familiar with the general theories, theorems, and voting methods presented, and for those interested in updating their understanding of the more recent literature on these topics.' Review of Radical Political Economics, December 1998