Cartels

Edited by Margaret C. Levenstein, Executive Director, Michigan Census Research Data Center, Associate Research Scientist, Institute for Social Research and Adjunct Associate Professor, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, US and Stephen W. Salant, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, US

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction Margaret C. Levenstein and Stephen W. Salant PART IHISTORICAL AGREEMENTS FOR VOLUME RESTRICTING ARRANGEMENTS 1. (1891), ‘Agreement of the Southern Railway and Steamship Association’2. Document ref #080017 – Agreement Between the Dow Chemical Company and the Deutsche Bromkonvention regarding the Global Bromine Market, Midland, MI: Post Street Archives3. (1943), ‘International Steel Agreement. September 30, 1926’4. (1945), ‘International Sulphur Agreement of 1934’ and ‘Sulphur Agreement of 1936’5. (1945), ‘World Copper Agreement of 1935’6. (1945), ‘American-German Agreement of 1938 Concerning Electro Appliances’7. (1974), Marketing Agreement for Navel Oranges Grown in Arizona and Designated Part of California, Washington, DC: US Department of Agriculture, Consumer and Marketing Service, Fruit and Vegetable Division and Submission on Behalf of the California Arizona Citrus League8. (1980), International Electrical Association: A Continuing Cartel, Report prepared for the Use of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce United States House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, June, Washington, DC: US GPO9. (2000), An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of International Cartels, Speech by James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, April 6PART IITHE “CARTEL PROBLEM” ATheoretical10. Don Patinkin (1947), ‘Multiple-Plant Firms, Cartels, and Imperfect Competition’11. Joe S. Bain (1948), ‘Output Quotas in Imperfect Cartels’12. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’13. D.K. Osborne (1976), ‘Cartel Problems’BEmpirical14. Richard A. Posner (1970), ‘A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement’15. Joseph C. Gallo, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Joseph L. Craycraft and Charles J. Parker (2000), ‘Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955–1997: An Empirical Study’PART IIIMONITORING/ENFORCEMENT ATheoretical16. James W. Friedman (1971), ‘A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames’17. Edward J. Green and Robert H. Porter (1984), ‘Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information’18. Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1990), ‘Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring’19. Peter C. Cramton and Thomas R. Palfrey (1990), ‘Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs’20. Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin (1994), ‘The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information’21. Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1986), ‘A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms’22. John Haltiwanger and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (1991), ‘The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior’23. Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna (1985), ‘Finitely Repeated Games’24. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior’B Empirical25. Robert H. Porter (1983), ‘A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886’26. Glenn Ellison (1994), ‘Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee’27. Margaret C. Levenstein (1997), ‘Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry’28. Margaret E. Slade (1992), ‘Vancouver’s Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering Supergame Strategies’29. Severin Borenstein and Andrea Shepard (1996), ‘Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets’PART IVINSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 30. Gérard Gaudet and Stephen W. Salant (1991), ‘Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes’31. Claude D’Aspremont, Alexis Jacquemin, Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz and John A. Weymark (1983), ‘On The Stability of Collusive Price Leadership’32. Joel M. Podolny and Fiona M. Scott Morton (1999), ‘Social Status, Entry and Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929’33. George Symeonidis (2000), ‘Price Competition and Market Structure: The Impact of Cartel Policy on Concentration in the UK’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume IPART IHETEROGENEITY 1. Steven N. Wiggins and Gary D. Libecap (1987), ‘Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oil’2. William S. Hallagan (1985), ‘Contracting Problems and the Adoption of Regulatory Cartels’3. Jonathan Cave and Stephen W. Salant (1995), ‘Cartel Quotas Under Majority Rule’4. Barbara J. Alexander (1997), ‘Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous Industries Under the National Recovery Administration’5. Joseph E. Harrington Jr. (1991), ‘The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel’6. Olivier Compte, Frédéric Jenny and Patrick Rey (2002), ‘Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion’PART IIVERTICAL RESTRAINTS 7. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1985), ‘Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion’8. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case’9. Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz (1995), ‘The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers’ Competition’PART IIINATURAL RESOURCE CARTELS 10. Glenn C. Loury (1986), ‘A Theory of ‘Oil’igopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Exhaustible Resource Markets with Fixed Supplies’11. Charles F. Mason and Stephen Polasky (2005), ‘What Motivates Membership in Non-Renewable Resource Cartels?: The Case of OPEC’12. Stephen Polasky (1992), ‘Do Oil Producers Act as ‘Oil’igopolists?’13. Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Robert S. Pindyck (1987), ‘Cartel Theory and Cartel Experience in International Minerals Markets’14. Debora L. Spar (1994), ‘The Power to Persuade and the Success of the International Diamond Cartel’15. Gary D. Libecap and James L. Smith (2004), ‘Political Constraints on Government Cartelization: The Case of Oil Production Regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia’PART IVCONTRACTING AND COMMUNICATION ISSUES 16. Kai-Uwe Kühn (2001), ‘Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication between Firms’17. Valerie Y. Suslow (2005), ‘Cartel Contract Duration: Empirical Evidence from Inter-War International Cartels’18. David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin (2001), ‘Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case’19. Margaret E. Slade (1990), ‘Strategic Pricing Models and Interpretation of Price-War Data’PART VCOLLUSION AND INVESTMENT 20. Chaim Fershtman and Ariel Pakes (2000), ‘A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars’21. Carl Davidson and Raymond Deneckere (1990), ‘Excess Capacity and Collusion’22. Chaim Fershtman and Neil Gandal (1994), ‘Disadvantageous Semicollusion’23. Frode Steen and Lars Sørgard (1999), ‘Semicollusion in the Norwegian Cement Market’24. George Symeonidis (2001), ‘Price Competition, Innovation and Profitability: Theory and UK Evidence’PART VICONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 25. John M. Connor (2001), ‘“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995’26. Lawrence J. White (2001), ‘Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?’27. Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2001), ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s’28. Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2004), ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’Name Index

’This is the ultimate collection of primary documents and previously published economic articles on cartels, carefully selected and clearly presented in ten parts. Although the focus is mainly on the economics of cartels, lawyers will also find extremely interesting material on historical cartel agreements, theoretical and empirical studies on cartel enforcement and game-theory analyses of cartel behaviour. A must have for any serious competition law library.’