Blame

Its Nature and Norms

Häftad, Engelska, 2013

559 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar. Fri frakt för medlemmar vid köp för minst 249 kr.

One mark of interpersonal relationships is a tendency to blame. But what precise evaluations and responses constitute blame? Is it most centrally a judgment, or is it an emotion, or something else? Does blame express a demand, or embody a protest, or does it simply mark an impaired relationship? What accounts for its force or sting, and how similar is it to punishment?The essays in this volume explore answers to these (and other) questions about the nature of blame, but they also explore the various norms that govern the propriety of blame. The traditional question is whether anyone ever deserves to be blamed, but the essays here provide a fresh perspective by focusing on blame from the blamer's perspective instead. Is our tendency to blame a vice, something we should work to replace with more humane ways of relating, or does it rather lie at the very heart of a commitment to morality? What can we legitimately expect of each other, and in general, what sort of attitude do would-be blamers need to have in order to have the standing to blame? Hypocritical or self-righteous blame seems objectionable, but why?The contributions to this volume aim to give us a fuller picture of the nature and norms of blame, and more generally of the promises and perils of membership in the human moral community.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2013-01-31
Mått155 x 231 x 25 mm
Vikt454 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor336
FörlagOUP USA
ISBN9780199860845

Tillhör följande kategorier

D. Justin Coates works on issues in ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action. His publications have appeared in Philosophy Compass, Philosophical Psychology, and Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, among other venues. He is the Law and Philosophy Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School.Neal A. Tognazzini works at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics on problems of agency, free will, and moral responsibility. His publications have appeared in Nous, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, The Philosophical Quarterly, and Philosophy and Public Affairs, among other venues. He is an Assistant Professor at The College of William & Mary.

Chapter 1: The Contours of Blame ; D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini ; Chapter 2: Moral Blame and Moral Protest ; Angela M. Smith ; Chapter 3: Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of the Stranger ; George Sher ; Chapter 4: The Expressive Function of Blame ; Christopher Bennett ; Chapter 5: Interpreting Blame ; T. M. Scanlon ; Chapter 6: Blame and Punishment ; David Shoemaker ; Chapter 7: Directed Blame and Conversation ; Michael McKenna ; Chapter 8: Taking Demands Out of Blame ; Coleen Macnamara ; Chapter 9: Civilizing Blame ; Victoria McGeer ; Chapter 10: Free Will Skepticism, Blame, and Obligation ; Derk Pereboom ; Chapter 11: Valuing Blame ; Christopher Evan Franklin ; Chapter 12: Rightness and Responsibility ; R. Jay Wallace ; Chapter 13: What is an Excuse? ; Erin I. Kelly ; Chapter 14: The Standing to Blame: A Critique ; Macalester Bell ; Chapter 15: Standing in Judgment ; Gary Watson ; References