Bayesian Persuasion

This volume brings together the collected contributions of Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica, and several coauthors on the theme of Bayesian Persuasion.The collection starts with an introduction that positions the research on Bayesian Persuasion relative to prior work on information economics. Earlier work typically takes the informational environment — what agents know about the underlying states of the world that matter for their decision problems — as given. The agenda of Bayesian Persuasion focuses on optimizing the informational environment: deciding who should know what and when.The chapters in the volume cover foundational contributions to the literature on Bayesian Persuasion as well as extensions of the basic model (costly information generation, multiple senders, dynamic information revelation, etc), methodological approaches to information design, and the implications of the results for important topics in social science such as whether competition in the market place for ideas induces more information revelation.