Attributing Knowledge

Jody Azzouni received his doctorate from The CUNY Graduate Center and is Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He writes broadly in philosophy of mathematics, science, logic and language, as well as in epistemology and metaphysics.

• ContentsIntroduction1. Knowledge attributions to minimal epistemic agents2. Knowledge and knowing that P; "knowledge" and "knowing that P"3. The variability of know(s) that judgments4. Assertion norms5. Usage traps in the language of iterated knowledge attributions6. Iterated and ground-floor knowledge, KK and K¬K, arguments and empirical studies7. Inferential justification8. Representational justification and challenges to "the given"9. Confidence, belief and knowledge; the vagueness of "know(s)"10. Usage challenges to fallibilism11. The (complex) structure of the meaning of "know(s)"Appendix: The aesthetics of hangman knots Detailed ContentsIntroductionPart 1i. Epistemology: What it isii. The importance of wordsiii. Some of the distinctive epistemic claims I attempt in this bookiv. Brief synopses of the chapters in this bookPart 2v. Insights from lexical semantics: Ambiguity and polysemyvi. Insights from lexical semantics: Retraction and the factivity of "know(s)"vii. Insights from lexical semantics: Literality and metaphoricalityviii. Insights from lexical semantics: Semantic entailmentsix. The lexical analysis of words versus the functional analysis of themx. An example: "true" xi. Xphilosophy and the threat of idiolectical scepticism1. Knowledge attributions to minimal epistemic agents1.1 First remarks1.2 What animals know1.3 Insects and non-biological things know a lot too1.4 The flexibility of cognition attributions: *Q ing that p1.5 Knowledge, belief, action and consciousness1.6 Knowledge and belief (and consciousness too)1.7 Mindless knowing1.8 Final lesson from knowledge attributions to animals: Methods of knowing aren't modular1.9 What's been done and a look ahead2. Knowledge and knowing that A; "knowledge" and "knowing that"2.1 First remarks2.2 "Knowledge"2.3 "Knowing P" and "knowing that P"3. The variability of know(s)-that judgments3.1 First remarks3.2 Some thought experiments that are problematic for classic invariantists3.3 Hawthorne's DSK principle3.4 Comparing knowing and knowledge attributions across contexts3.5 Comparing knowing and knowledge attributions across agents3.6 Knowledge-relativism denied3.7 What speaker-hearers can reasonably be taken to be confused about with respect to their own usage3.8 Making progress? (Where we are and where we're going)4. Assertion norms4.1 Introduction; preliminaries about assertion4.2 Semantic perceptions4.3 Experiencing asserting, assertions, and their differences4.4 The assertions of spokespersons and Moorean remarks4.5 Assertions: Of journalists, in advertisements, by cartoon characters and flakes4.6 Assertion norms4.7 Burge's acceptance principle4.8 Expectations in special cases4.9 Concluding remarks5. Usage traps in the language of iterated knowledge attributions5.1 Introductory remarks about KK and K¬K, and about metacognition5.2 Exclamation and redundancy uses of "know(s)"5.3 Redundancy usages for "aware" and the puzzling case of pain5.4 Iterated knowledge and an agent's command of her concepts5.5 Davidson, Dretske, Esken, and Malcolm on metacognition, cognition, belief and metabelief5.6 Iterated knowledge and belief, and justification5.7 Level-confusions in epistemology5.8 Conclusion and transition to the next chapter6. Iterated and ground-floor cognition, KK and K¬K arguments and empirical studies6.1 Introduction6.2 The Cartesian perspective: Full metacognition about the self6.3 A very minimal ground-floor epistemic agent who cognizes and knows without iterated knowledge or cognitions6.4 The non-transparency of knowing state6.5 Iterated knowledge about deduction6.6 Nonhuman-animal studies in "metacognition"6.7 A possible case of nonhuman-animal iterated cognition?6.8 Conclusion7. Inferential justification7.1 First remarks7.2 Justification and truth7.3 Justifications based on truth-preserving deduction7.4 Infinite chains of justifications7.4.1 Infinite deductive sequences of justifications7.4.2 Probabilistic infinite sequences of justifications7.4.3 A failing grade for infinitism, nevertheless7.5 Conclusion8. Representational justification and challenges to the given8.1 Representational justification characterized8.2 Representation and deduction exhaust justification8.3 The given-dilemma for nonpropositional justification8.4 Why representational justifications needn't be experiential8.5 There are justificational stopping points8.6 Justificational stopping points in conversation8.7 Metacognitive motivations for enriching justification8.8 Concluding remarks9. Confidence, belief and knowledge; the vagueness of "know(s)"9.1 Introduction9.2 Piecemeal knowledge and piecemeal iterated knowledge9.3 Confidence, knowledge and iterated knowledge9.4 The invisibility of epistemic standards; the invisibility of the vagueness of epistemic standards9.5 Williamson on KK9.6 Concluding remarks10. Usage challenges to fallibilism10.1 Introduction10.2 Preliminaries: Characterizing fallibilism, infallibilism and parity reasoning10.3 When factivity misleads10.4 The factivity of "know(s)" and Kripke's dogmatism paradox10.5 The factivity and fallibility of "know(s)," and lotteries10.6 Going to extremes10.7 Prefaces and lotteries10.8 Fallibility implies the denial of knowledge closure10.9 Rational belief and concluding remarks11. The (complex) structure of the meaning of "know(s)"11.1 Introduction11.2 Necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for "know(s)"; the relation of these conditions to criterion transcendence11.3 Why "know(s)" evades a definition11.4 Conceptually engineering a successor notion to "know(s)"?11.5 Social-role epistemology11.6 Conclusion (to the whole book)Appendix: The aesthetics of hangman knots

... an excellent, engaging piece of analytic philosophy...Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty.