Arguments and Reason-Giving

Matthew W. McKeon is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University where he has been Chair of the Department of Philosophy since 2011.

• Chapter 1: IntroductionPart I: Arguments, Inference Claims, and Reflective InferenceChapter 2: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments2.1 Preamble2.2 Arguing and arguments2.3 Arguments in informal logic, argumentation studies, and formal logic2.3.1 Arguments in informal logic2.3.2 Argumentation studies2.3.3 Arguments in formal logic 2.4 Reason-giving uses of arguments2.5 ConclusionChapter 3: Inference Claims3.1 Preamble3.2 Argument claims and uses of arguments 3.3 The connection between inference claims and reason-giving uses of argument 3.3.1 Inference claim and reasons for believing3.3.2 Dialectical arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments 3.4 How, exactly, are inference claims conveyed by one's statement of an argument? 3.4.1 Mere implication3.4.2 Conversational implicature 3.4.3 Conventional implicature3.4.4 Assertion3.5 ConclusionChapter 4: Reflective Inference 4.1 Preamble4.2 Critical Thinking 4.2.1 Baseline characterizations of critical thinking4.2.2 Inference and critical thinking 4.3 Reflective inferences and reason-giving uses of arguments4.4 ConclusionPart II: Formal Validity, Rational Persuasion, Argumentative Rationality, Intellectual Honest and Intellectual IntegrityChapter 5: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments, Formally Valid Arguments, and Demonstrative Arguments 5.1 Preamble5.2 Deductive arguments, demonstrative arguments, and reflective inferences5.3 Formally valid arguments and demonstrative arguments5.4 Formally valid arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments 5.5 Demonstrative arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments5.6 Conclusion Chapter 6: Reason-Giving Uses of Argument, Invitations to Inference, and Rational Persuasion6.1 Preamble6.2 Invitations to inference are reason-giving uses of arguments 6.3 Invitations to inference invite only the inferences expressed by the arguments used6.4 Indirect persuasion 6.5 Conclusion Chapter 7: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments and Argumentative Rationality7.1 Preamble7.2 Reason for belief and the rationality of belief 7.3 The Pragma-epistemic approach to argumentative rationality7.4. The epistemic and pragma-dialectic approaches to argumentative rationality 7.4.1 The objective epistemic approach to argumentative rationality 7.4.2 The Pragma-dialectic approach to argumentative rationality 7.5 Argumentative rationality and good argumentation7.6 ConclusionChapter 8: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments, Intellectual Honesty, and Intellectual integrity8.1 Preamble8.2 Intellectual honesty and truthfulness8.3 Reason-giving uses of arguments and intellectual honesty 8.4 Reason-giving uses of arguments and intellectual integrity8.5 ConclusionIndex

McKeon conceives of an argument as being something that can be used as an inferential statement and is the type of reason-giving argument often depicted in argumentation and informal logic literature. He views such an argument as a rationally intentional argument, which offers premises providing reasons for believing its conclusion is true.