Algorithmic Game Theory

14th International Symposium, SAGT 2021, Aarhus, Denmark, September 21–24, 2021, Proceedings

Häftad, Engelska, 2021

Av Ioannis Caragiannis, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen

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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021. The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2021-08-28
Mått155 x 235 x 24 mm
Vikt663 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SerieLecture Notes in Computer Science
Antal sidor414
FörlagSpringer Nature Switzerland AG
ISBN9783030859466

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Auctions and Mechanism Design.- Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming.- The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions.- Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation.- Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location.- Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.- Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection.- Computational Aspects of Games.- On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium.- Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents.- Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games- Gerrymandering on graphs: Computational complexity and parameterized algorithms.- Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts.- Algorithmic Challenges in Information Design XVII.- On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games.-Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failures.- Markets and Matchings.- On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching.- Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets.- Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget.- Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets.- The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences.- Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many Strategic Agents are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality?.- Social Choice and Cooperative Games.- Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information.- Hedonic Expertise Games.- When Dividing Mixed Manna is Easier than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores.- Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values.- An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid Democracy.- Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers.- Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria Guarantees.- Abstracts.- On Reward Sharing in Blockchain Mining Pools.- On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap.- Vote Delegation and Misbehavio.