This book analyzes China's bureaucratic behavior since the inauguration of administrative reform in the late 1970s. Although bureaucratic behavior in China in the past decade was increasingly corrupted, this aspect of China's post-Mao reform has not been subjected to a rigorous scrutiny. This book explores the gulf between desired and the actual bureaucratic behavior among China's public administrators. The author argues that this behavioral gap in China's modernization stems from several factors including the nation's cultural heritage, the ruling party's approach to government, and the absence of trusted, full-fledged academic groups assigned to advise on administrative reform. The book then probes one of the gravest consequences of the behavioral gap: 'reform corruption', a phenomenon which seems to be a mixed blessing of modernization.

This book analyzes China's bureaucratic behavior since the inauguration of administrative reform in the late 1970s. Although bureaucratic behavior in China in the past decade was increasingly corrupted, this aspect of China's post-Mao reform has not been subjected to a rigorous scrutiny. This book explores the gulf between desired and the actual bureaucratic behavior among China's public administrators. The author argues that this behavioral gap in China's modernization stems from several factors including the nation's cultural heritage, the ruling party's approach to government, and the absence of trusted, full-fledged academic groups assigned to advise on administrative reform. The book then probes one of the gravest consequences of the behavioral gap: 'reform corruption', a phenomenon which seems to be a mixed blessing of modernization.

This book analyzes China's bureaucratic behavior since the inauguration of administrative reform in the late 1970s. Although bureaucratic behavior in China in the past decade was increasingly corrupted, this aspect of China's post-Mao reform has not been subjected to a rigorous scrutiny. This book explores the gulf between desired and the actual bureaucratic behavior among China's public administrators. The author argues that this behavioral gap in China's modernization stems from several factors including the nation's cultural heritage, the ruling party's approach to government, and the absence of trusted, full-fledged academic groups assigned to advise on administrative reform. The book then probes one of the gravest consequences of the behavioral gap: 'reform corruption', a phenomenon which seems to be a mixed blessing of modernization.