Abusive Constitutional Borrowing

Rosalind Dixon is a Professor of Law at UNSW, Sydney, Australia. She is co-editor, with Tom Ginsburg, of a leading handbook, Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) and related volumes, Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (Edward Elgar, 2014), and Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America (Edward Elgar, 2017). Professor Dixon is a Manos Research Fellow, Director of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Deputy Director of the Herbert Smith Freehills Initiative on Law and Economics, Co-Director of the UNSW New Economic Equality Initiative (NEEI), and academic co-lead of the Grand Challenge on Inequality at UNSW. She was recently elected as co-president of the International Society of Public Law.Professor Landau is a recognized scholar on constitutional theory, constitutional design and comparative constitutional law. His recent work has focused on a range of issues with contemporary salience both in the United States and elsewhere around the world, including constitutional change and constitution-making, judicial role and the enforcement of rights, impeachment, and the erosion of democracy. His scholarship is interdisciplinary, combining insights from law and political science. Professor Landau has published in leading law journals including the University of Chicago Law Review, the Iowa Law Review, the George Washington Law Review, and the Harvard International Law Journal. He has previously published several books and edited volumes with Oxford University Press and Edward Elgar Press.

• 1: Introduction: A Dark Side of Comparative Constitutional Law2: Democracy and Abusive Constitutional Change3: The Concept and Scope of Abusive Constitutional Borrowing4: The Abuse of Constitutional Rights5: Abusive Judicial Review6: The Abuse of Constituent Power7: The Abusive Borrowing of Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form Judicial Review8: Can Abusive Borrowing Be Stopped?

Dixon and Landau document the extent to which autocratic leaders have figured out how to convert independent courts and written rights guarantees into tools for consolidating power, repressing the opposition, and sidelining minorities. They support this account with a remarkable range of empirical examples, drawn from virtually all regions of the constitutional world.