A 'Blended System' of Judicial Review in Germany

Born in 1995; studied law at the University of Münster and the University of Waikato; 2019 First State Examination in Law; research associate at the Institute for Public Law and Politics at the University of Münster; 2024 doctorate after research visits to the University of New South Wales in Sydney, the University of Melbourne, and the Victoria University of Wellington; legal trainee at the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court.

• A. IntroductionI. Proposal of a ‘blended system’ of judicial review - II. Argument for a ‘blended system’ of rights-based judicial review of federal legislation within the German constitutional orderB. An alternative form of judicial review within the German constitutional orderI. Weak-form judicial review and the related international debate -II. Meaning of ‘weak-form and strong-form judicial review’C. The German strong-form system of rights-based judicial review of legislationI. Historical decision for a system of constitutional judicial review - II. Existing constitutional design mechanism providing for the court’s strong-form review powers - III. Conclusion and outlookD. Towards weak-form judicial review in GermanyI. Proposal of a ‘blended system’ of judicial review within the German constitutional order review - II. Absence of weak-form judicial review ideas in Germany - III. Placing the proposal within the German constitutional debate - IV. Concluding observations: Proposal of a blended system within the German constitutional orderE. Benefits of a blended system of rights-based judicial review of legislation within the German constitutional orderI. Previously identified benefits - II. Creating a more appropriate constitutional balance between constitutional principles conflicting in the shape of the court’s strong-form review powers - III. Additional outcome-related constitutional benefits - IV. ConclusionF. Implementing the proposed blended system on the institutional levelI. Preliminary considerations - II. Defining constitutional constraints - III. Existing room within key constitutional constraints for other forms of weak-form judicial review - IV. Outlook: Additional conversation on the appropriateness of weak-form reviewG. Conclusion