Jean-Claude Amiard is a State Doctor in Radioecology, Emeritus Research Director at CNRS (University of Nantes) and former Associate Professor in Quebec and China. He is the author of more than 200 publications, 76 books or chapters and 150 papers for international conferences.

• Acknowledgments xiPreface xiiiChapter 1. Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk 11.1. Introduction 11.2. Danger, exposure, radiotoxicity and risk 41.2.1. Identification of radionuclide hazards 51.2.2. Contamination of the environment, including the anthroposphere, by radionuclides 71.2.3. Exposure to radiation 111.2.4. Collective doses 171.3. From dose to adverse effect in non-human organisms (flora and fauna) 171.3.1. The harmful effects of ionizing radiation 181.3.2. The dose–response relationship 201.3.3. Recommended threshold values 221.4. From dose to adverse effect in humans 241.4.1. Deterministic and stochastic effects 241.4.2. Dose–response relationships for average doses: epidemiological studies 251.4.3. Responses to low doses 261.5. Radiation protection and recommendations for human irradiation 321.6. Risk perception 351.6.1. Probability of a future nuclear accident 361.6.2. Countries using or renouncing the use of nuclear energy 371.6.3. Opinion polls on nuclear power 381.6.4. Estimated risk and perceived risk 411.7. Conclusion 42Chapter 2. Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents 452.1. Early signals and late lessons 452.2. Structures for disseminating information on radioactive risk 452.2.1. Situation from 1945 to 1990 462.2.2. Situation from the Chernobyl accident to the present day 472.2.3. The example of France 482.2.4. Future change? 502.3. Feedback (REX) 512.3.1. Introduction: what is REX? 512.3.2. The overall REX process 522.3.3. Causes of REX failure 542.4. Lessons from the past 552.4.1. Lessons learned from military nuclear activities and accidents 552.4.2. Lessons from industrial accidents 572.4.3. Medical accidents 722.5. Crisis exercises 772.5.1. Transnational exercises 772.5.2. National exercises 782.6. Incident and accident reporting 802.6.1. A common severity scale 802.6.2. Management of declarations 812.6.3. Reporting systems 812.6.4. Websites 822.7. Conclusion 83Chapter 3. Research for the Future 853.1. Introduction: safety and the main types of accidents 853.1.1. Safety history 853.1.2. The main safety objectives 863.1.3. Defense in depth 873.1.4. New research in the field of nuclear safety 883.1.5. The aging of nuclear installations 903.2. International actions 923.2.1. Improving the organization of security at the level of each state 923.2.2. The IAEA 943.2.3. The NEA 953.2.4. The ICRP 983.2.5. UNSCEAR 993.2.6. The ICRU 1003.2.7. The IRSN at international level 1003.3. European actions 1013.3.1. Euratom 1013.3.2. Complementary safety assessments (ECS) process 1023.4. French actions 1033.5. Advances in nuclear safety 1063.5.1. Better knowledge of nuclear fuel 1073.5.2. Better preventing the risk of steam and hydrogen explosions 1103.5.3. Controlling radionuclide releases 1113.5.4. Consequences of a fire 1123.5.5. Knowing more about corium 1133.5.6. Controlling a water injection into a molten core 1153.5.7. Mastering electrical distribution systems 1153.5.8. Improving modeling 1163.6. Advances in radioecology 1183.6.1. Determination of the source term 1183.6.2. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in the terrestrial environment 1193.6.3. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in aquatic environments 1203.6.4. Modeling of trophic transfer of radionuclides in organisms 1213.7. Advances in radiation protection 1213.7.1. Improving the radiological protection system 1223.7.2. Improving the management of a nuclear accident 1253.8. Safety research in other types of nuclear installations 1283.8.1. Cooling pools 1283.8.2. Spent fuel reprocessing plants 1293.8.3. Sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors 1293.8.4. ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) fusion facility 1293.8.5. Better understanding of criticality 1303.9. Advances in the humanities and social sciences 1303.10. Conclusion 131Chapter 4. Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident 1334.1. Introduction 1334.2. The first actions of the threat and rejection periods 1344.2.1. Radioactive releases in the event of an accident from a nuclear reactor 1354.2.2. Radioactivity measurements during a nuclear accident 1364.3. Population management in the emergency phase 1384.3.1. Containment or sheltering of the population 1404.3.2. Mass evacuation or evacuation of part of the population 1414.3.3. Distribution of stable iodine tablets 1524.4. Food supply management 1564.4.1. Recommended values 1564.4.2. Regulatory values 1584.5. Intervention levels for the protection of populations 1604.5.1. International recommendations 1604.5.2. The texts of the various states 1634.6. The organization of crisis management in France 1644.6.1. Documentation of the ORSEC plan 1654.6.2. The subdivisions of the ORSEC plan 1674.6.3. French actors in nuclear crisis management 1674.6.4. The internal emergency plan 1684.6.5. The plan particulier d’intervention (PPI, special intervention plans) 1704.6.6. Other complementary plans of the PPI 1804.7. Exiting the emergency phase 1824.8. Conclusion 183Chapter 5. Management of the Post-accident Phase 1855.1. Introduction 1855.2. The actions to be taken 1865.2.1. Priority actions to be undertaken 1875.2.2. Actions during the transitional period 1885.2.3. Long-term actions 1895.2.4. Radioactivity measurements following a nuclear accident 1905.3. Environmental management 1915.3.1. Management of aquatic environments 1915.3.2. Management of terrestrial environments 1935.4. Managing the anthroposphere 1955.4.1. Decontamination of living areas 1965.4.2. Nuclear waste management 1965.4.3. Agricultural management 1975.4.4. Managing the economy 2025.4.5. Food supply management 2035.5. Management of exposed populations 2045.5.1. Limiting people’s exposure to radiation 2045.5.2. Radiological monitoring of exposed populations 2065.5.3. Radiological and health monitoring of nuclear workers 2085.5.4. Health monitoring of exposed populations 2085.5.5. The return of evacuated populations 2095.5.6. The experience of local populations in contaminated environments 2115.5.7. Human dignity 2115.6. The organization of post-accident management 2125.6.1. International and European recommendations 2125.6.2. French doctrine 2155.7. Conclusion 221Chapter 6. Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security 2236.1. Introduction 2236.2. Malicious acts 2246.2.1. Attempts at radiation aggression 2256.2.2. The assassination of Alexander Litvinenko 2256.2.3. Arafat’s death 2266.2.4. Overflights and intrusions into nuclear facilities 2286.3. Possible terrorist attacks 2286.3.1. The use of a nuclear weapon 2296.3.2. The use of a “dirty” bomb 2296.3.3. Attack on a nuclear installation or transport 2316.3.4. The release of radioactive material 2316.3.5. Cyber-attacks 2326.4. The consequences of a terrorist act in the nuclear field 2336.4.1. The health consequences 2346.4.2. The psychological consequences 2366.4.3. Countermeasures in the event of terrorist attacks 2376.5. Organizational preparation for a terrorist threat 2406.6. Prevention of terrorist risk in the nuclear field 2426.6.1. Nuclear non-proliferation 2426.6.2. Trafficking in military weapons and radionuclides 2456.6.3. The actions to be taken 2476.6.4. The limitation of nuclear materials 2486.7. Conclusion 249Chapter 7. General Conclusions 2537.1. The probability of military and civil accidents 2537.1.1. Nuclear risks and probabilities 2537.1.2. The causes of accidents 2547.2. The environmental consequences of accidents 2557.3. The health consequences of accidents 2567.4. The economic consequences of accidents 2607.5. Prevention of nuclear accidents 2627.6. Management of the emergency and post-accident phases 2647.7. Perception of nuclear risk 2647.8. Public information 265References 269Acronyms and Abbreviations 339Index 355

Jean-Claude Amiard is a State Doctor in Radioecology, Emeritus Research Director at CNRS (University of Nantes) and former Associate Professor in Quebec and China. He is the author of more than 200 publications, 76 books or chapters and 150 papers for international conferences.

• Acknowledgments xiPreface xiiiChapter 1. Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk 11.1. Introduction 11.2. Danger, exposure, radiotoxicity and risk 41.2.1. Identification of radionuclide hazards 51.2.2. Contamination of the environment, including the anthroposphere, by radionuclides 71.2.3. Exposure to radiation 111.2.4. Collective doses 171.3. From dose to adverse effect in non-human organisms (flora and fauna) 171.3.1. The harmful effects of ionizing radiation 181.3.2. The dose–response relationship 201.3.3. Recommended threshold values 221.4. From dose to adverse effect in humans 241.4.1. Deterministic and stochastic effects 241.4.2. Dose–response relationships for average doses: epidemiological studies 251.4.3. Responses to low doses 261.5. Radiation protection and recommendations for human irradiation 321.6. Risk perception 351.6.1. Probability of a future nuclear accident 361.6.2. Countries using or renouncing the use of nuclear energy 371.6.3. Opinion polls on nuclear power 381.6.4. Estimated risk and perceived risk 411.7. Conclusion 42Chapter 2. Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents 452.1. Early signals and late lessons 452.2. Structures for disseminating information on radioactive risk 452.2.1. Situation from 1945 to 1990 462.2.2. Situation from the Chernobyl accident to the present day 472.2.3. The example of France 482.2.4. Future change? 502.3. Feedback (REX) 512.3.1. Introduction: what is REX? 512.3.2. The overall REX process 522.3.3. Causes of REX failure 542.4. Lessons from the past 552.4.1. Lessons learned from military nuclear activities and accidents 552.4.2. Lessons from industrial accidents 572.4.3. Medical accidents 722.5. Crisis exercises 772.5.1. Transnational exercises 772.5.2. National exercises 782.6. Incident and accident reporting 802.6.1. A common severity scale 802.6.2. Management of declarations 812.6.3. Reporting systems 812.6.4. Websites 822.7. Conclusion 83Chapter 3. Research for the Future 853.1. Introduction: safety and the main types of accidents 853.1.1. Safety history 853.1.2. The main safety objectives 863.1.3. Defense in depth 873.1.4. New research in the field of nuclear safety 883.1.5. The aging of nuclear installations 903.2. International actions 923.2.1. Improving the organization of security at the level of each state 923.2.2. The IAEA 943.2.3. The NEA 953.2.4. The ICRP 983.2.5. UNSCEAR 993.2.6. The ICRU 1003.2.7. The IRSN at international level 1003.3. European actions 1013.3.1. Euratom 1013.3.2. Complementary safety assessments (ECS) process 1023.4. French actions 1033.5. Advances in nuclear safety 1063.5.1. Better knowledge of nuclear fuel 1073.5.2. Better preventing the risk of steam and hydrogen explosions 1103.5.3. Controlling radionuclide releases 1113.5.4. Consequences of a fire 1123.5.5. Knowing more about corium 1133.5.6. Controlling a water injection into a molten core 1153.5.7. Mastering electrical distribution systems 1153.5.8. Improving modeling 1163.6. Advances in radioecology 1183.6.1. Determination of the source term 1183.6.2. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in the terrestrial environment 1193.6.3. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in aquatic environments 1203.6.4. Modeling of trophic transfer of radionuclides in organisms 1213.7. Advances in radiation protection 1213.7.1. Improving the radiological protection system 1223.7.2. Improving the management of a nuclear accident 1253.8. Safety research in other types of nuclear installations 1283.8.1. Cooling pools 1283.8.2. Spent fuel reprocessing plants 1293.8.3. Sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors 1293.8.4. ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) fusion facility 1293.8.5. Better understanding of criticality 1303.9. Advances in the humanities and social sciences 1303.10. Conclusion 131Chapter 4. Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident 1334.1. Introduction 1334.2. The first actions of the threat and rejection periods 1344.2.1. Radioactive releases in the event of an accident from a nuclear reactor 1354.2.2. Radioactivity measurements during a nuclear accident 1364.3. Population management in the emergency phase 1384.3.1. Containment or sheltering of the population 1404.3.2. Mass evacuation or evacuation of part of the population 1414.3.3. Distribution of stable iodine tablets 1524.4. Food supply management 1564.4.1. Recommended values 1564.4.2. Regulatory values 1584.5. Intervention levels for the protection of populations 1604.5.1. International recommendations 1604.5.2. The texts of the various states 1634.6. The organization of crisis management in France 1644.6.1. Documentation of the ORSEC plan 1654.6.2. The subdivisions of the ORSEC plan 1674.6.3. French actors in nuclear crisis management 1674.6.4. The internal emergency plan 1684.6.5. The plan particulier d’intervention (PPI, special intervention plans) 1704.6.6. Other complementary plans of the PPI 1804.7. Exiting the emergency phase 1824.8. Conclusion 183Chapter 5. Management of the Post-accident Phase 1855.1. Introduction 1855.2. The actions to be taken 1865.2.1. Priority actions to be undertaken 1875.2.2. Actions during the transitional period 1885.2.3. Long-term actions 1895.2.4. Radioactivity measurements following a nuclear accident 1905.3. Environmental management 1915.3.1. Management of aquatic environments 1915.3.2. Management of terrestrial environments 1935.4. Managing the anthroposphere 1955.4.1. Decontamination of living areas 1965.4.2. Nuclear waste management 1965.4.3. Agricultural management 1975.4.4. Managing the economy 2025.4.5. Food supply management 2035.5. Management of exposed populations 2045.5.1. Limiting people’s exposure to radiation 2045.5.2. Radiological monitoring of exposed populations 2065.5.3. Radiological and health monitoring of nuclear workers 2085.5.4. Health monitoring of exposed populations 2085.5.5. The return of evacuated populations 2095.5.6. The experience of local populations in contaminated environments 2115.5.7. Human dignity 2115.6. The organization of post-accident management 2125.6.1. International and European recommendations 2125.6.2. French doctrine 2155.7. Conclusion 221Chapter 6. Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security 2236.1. Introduction 2236.2. Malicious acts 2246.2.1. Attempts at radiation aggression 2256.2.2. The assassination of Alexander Litvinenko 2256.2.3. Arafat’s death 2266.2.4. Overflights and intrusions into nuclear facilities 2286.3. Possible terrorist attacks 2286.3.1. The use of a nuclear weapon 2296.3.2. The use of a “dirty” bomb 2296.3.3. Attack on a nuclear installation or transport 2316.3.4. The release of radioactive material 2316.3.5. Cyber-attacks 2326.4. The consequences of a terrorist act in the nuclear field 2336.4.1. The health consequences 2346.4.2. The psychological consequences 2366.4.3. Countermeasures in the event of terrorist attacks 2376.5. Organizational preparation for a terrorist threat 2406.6. Prevention of terrorist risk in the nuclear field 2426.6.1. Nuclear non-proliferation 2426.6.2. Trafficking in military weapons and radionuclides 2456.6.3. The actions to be taken 2476.6.4. The limitation of nuclear materials 2486.7. Conclusion 249Chapter 7. General Conclusions 2537.1. The probability of military and civil accidents 2537.1.1. Nuclear risks and probabilities 2537.1.2. The causes of accidents 2547.2. The environmental consequences of accidents 2557.3. The health consequences of accidents 2567.4. The economic consequences of accidents 2607.5. Prevention of nuclear accidents 2627.6. Management of the emergency and post-accident phases 2647.7. Perception of nuclear risk 2647.8. Public information 265References 269Acronyms and Abbreviations 339Index 355

Jean-Claude Amiard is a State Doctor in Radioecology, Emeritus Research Director at CNRS (University of Nantes) and former Associate Professor in Quebec and China. He is the author of more than 200 publications, 76 books or chapters and 150 papers for international conferences.

• Acknowledgments xiPreface xiiiChapter 1. Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk 11.1. Introduction 11.2. Danger, exposure, radiotoxicity and risk 41.2.1. Identification of radionuclide hazards 51.2.2. Contamination of the environment, including the anthroposphere, by radionuclides 71.2.3. Exposure to radiation 111.2.4. Collective doses 171.3. From dose to adverse effect in non-human organisms (flora and fauna) 171.3.1. The harmful effects of ionizing radiation 181.3.2. The dose–response relationship 201.3.3. Recommended threshold values 221.4. From dose to adverse effect in humans 241.4.1. Deterministic and stochastic effects 241.4.2. Dose–response relationships for average doses: epidemiological studies 251.4.3. Responses to low doses 261.5. Radiation protection and recommendations for human irradiation 321.6. Risk perception 351.6.1. Probability of a future nuclear accident 361.6.2. Countries using or renouncing the use of nuclear energy 371.6.3. Opinion polls on nuclear power 381.6.4. Estimated risk and perceived risk 411.7. Conclusion 42Chapter 2. Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents 452.1. Early signals and late lessons 452.2. Structures for disseminating information on radioactive risk 452.2.1. Situation from 1945 to 1990 462.2.2. Situation from the Chernobyl accident to the present day 472.2.3. The example of France 482.2.4. Future change? 502.3. Feedback (REX) 512.3.1. Introduction: what is REX? 512.3.2. The overall REX process 522.3.3. Causes of REX failure 542.4. Lessons from the past 552.4.1. Lessons learned from military nuclear activities and accidents 552.4.2. Lessons from industrial accidents 572.4.3. Medical accidents 722.5. Crisis exercises 772.5.1. Transnational exercises 772.5.2. National exercises 782.6. Incident and accident reporting 802.6.1. A common severity scale 802.6.2. Management of declarations 812.6.3. Reporting systems 812.6.4. Websites 822.7. Conclusion 83Chapter 3. Research for the Future 853.1. Introduction: safety and the main types of accidents 853.1.1. Safety history 853.1.2. The main safety objectives 863.1.3. Defense in depth 873.1.4. New research in the field of nuclear safety 883.1.5. The aging of nuclear installations 903.2. International actions 923.2.1. Improving the organization of security at the level of each state 923.2.2. The IAEA 943.2.3. The NEA 953.2.4. The ICRP 983.2.5. UNSCEAR 993.2.6. The ICRU 1003.2.7. The IRSN at international level 1003.3. European actions 1013.3.1. Euratom 1013.3.2. Complementary safety assessments (ECS) process 1023.4. French actions 1033.5. Advances in nuclear safety 1063.5.1. Better knowledge of nuclear fuel 1073.5.2. Better preventing the risk of steam and hydrogen explosions 1103.5.3. Controlling radionuclide releases 1113.5.4. Consequences of a fire 1123.5.5. Knowing more about corium 1133.5.6. Controlling a water injection into a molten core 1153.5.7. Mastering electrical distribution systems 1153.5.8. Improving modeling 1163.6. Advances in radioecology 1183.6.1. Determination of the source term 1183.6.2. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in the terrestrial environment 1193.6.3. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in aquatic environments 1203.6.4. Modeling of trophic transfer of radionuclides in organisms 1213.7. Advances in radiation protection 1213.7.1. Improving the radiological protection system 1223.7.2. Improving the management of a nuclear accident 1253.8. Safety research in other types of nuclear installations 1283.8.1. Cooling pools 1283.8.2. Spent fuel reprocessing plants 1293.8.3. Sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors 1293.8.4. ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) fusion facility 1293.8.5. Better understanding of criticality 1303.9. Advances in the humanities and social sciences 1303.10. Conclusion 131Chapter 4. Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident 1334.1. Introduction 1334.2. The first actions of the threat and rejection periods 1344.2.1. Radioactive releases in the event of an accident from a nuclear reactor 1354.2.2. Radioactivity measurements during a nuclear accident 1364.3. Population management in the emergency phase 1384.3.1. Containment or sheltering of the population 1404.3.2. Mass evacuation or evacuation of part of the population 1414.3.3. Distribution of stable iodine tablets 1524.4. Food supply management 1564.4.1. Recommended values 1564.4.2. Regulatory values 1584.5. Intervention levels for the protection of populations 1604.5.1. International recommendations 1604.5.2. The texts of the various states 1634.6. The organization of crisis management in France 1644.6.1. Documentation of the ORSEC plan 1654.6.2. The subdivisions of the ORSEC plan 1674.6.3. French actors in nuclear crisis management 1674.6.4. The internal emergency plan 1684.6.5. The plan particulier d’intervention (PPI, special intervention plans) 1704.6.6. Other complementary plans of the PPI 1804.7. Exiting the emergency phase 1824.8. Conclusion 183Chapter 5. Management of the Post-accident Phase 1855.1. Introduction 1855.2. The actions to be taken 1865.2.1. Priority actions to be undertaken 1875.2.2. Actions during the transitional period 1885.2.3. Long-term actions 1895.2.4. Radioactivity measurements following a nuclear accident 1905.3. Environmental management 1915.3.1. Management of aquatic environments 1915.3.2. Management of terrestrial environments 1935.4. Managing the anthroposphere 1955.4.1. Decontamination of living areas 1965.4.2. Nuclear waste management 1965.4.3. Agricultural management 1975.4.4. Managing the economy 2025.4.5. Food supply management 2035.5. Management of exposed populations 2045.5.1. Limiting people’s exposure to radiation 2045.5.2. Radiological monitoring of exposed populations 2065.5.3. Radiological and health monitoring of nuclear workers 2085.5.4. Health monitoring of exposed populations 2085.5.5. The return of evacuated populations 2095.5.6. The experience of local populations in contaminated environments 2115.5.7. Human dignity 2115.6. The organization of post-accident management 2125.6.1. International and European recommendations 2125.6.2. French doctrine 2155.7. Conclusion 221Chapter 6. Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security 2236.1. Introduction 2236.2. Malicious acts 2246.2.1. Attempts at radiation aggression 2256.2.2. The assassination of Alexander Litvinenko 2256.2.3. Arafat’s death 2266.2.4. Overflights and intrusions into nuclear facilities 2286.3. Possible terrorist attacks 2286.3.1. The use of a nuclear weapon 2296.3.2. The use of a “dirty” bomb 2296.3.3. Attack on a nuclear installation or transport 2316.3.4. The release of radioactive material 2316.3.5. Cyber-attacks 2326.4. The consequences of a terrorist act in the nuclear field 2336.4.1. The health consequences 2346.4.2. The psychological consequences 2366.4.3. Countermeasures in the event of terrorist attacks 2376.5. Organizational preparation for a terrorist threat 2406.6. Prevention of terrorist risk in the nuclear field 2426.6.1. Nuclear non-proliferation 2426.6.2. Trafficking in military weapons and radionuclides 2456.6.3. The actions to be taken 2476.6.4. The limitation of nuclear materials 2486.7. Conclusion 249Chapter 7. General Conclusions 2537.1. The probability of military and civil accidents 2537.1.1. Nuclear risks and probabilities 2537.1.2. The causes of accidents 2547.2. The environmental consequences of accidents 2557.3. The health consequences of accidents 2567.4. The economic consequences of accidents 2607.5. Prevention of nuclear accidents 2627.6. Management of the emergency and post-accident phases 2647.7. Perception of nuclear risk 2647.8. Public information 265References 269Acronyms and Abbreviations 339Index 355