Del i serien Studies in Economic Theory

Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

Häftad, Engelska, 2018

AvSuren Basov

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This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2018-06-07
Mått155 x 235 x 11 mm
Vikt295 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SerieStudies in Economic Theory
Antal sidor176
FörlagSpringer Verlag, Singapore
ISBN9789811093135

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Suren Basov is a visitor to the Centre for Economics and Financial Econometrics at Deakin University, Australia. His research interests lie in the areas of mechanism design, with a particular emphasis on multidimensional screening models, the theory of bounded rationality, and evolutionary game theory. He also does research in the areas of directed search and unemployment, and incentive provision within clubs, with a particular application to Islamic finance.

Chapter 1 Preface.- Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality.- Chapter 2 Introduction.- Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design.- Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design.- Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality.- Chapter 6 Conclusions.- Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design.- Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship.- Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems.- Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment.- Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.