Elizabeth Shaw is Senior Lecturer in Law at The University of Aberdeen. She is the co-editor of Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society (Cambridge, 2019), and The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment (2021).

• 1. Doubts about the justification of criminal sanctions; 2. The epistemic challenge to retributivism; 3. Evaluating retributivists' responses to the epistemic challenge; 4. Expanding the scope of the epistemic argument to cover nonpunitive incapacitation; 5. The convergence approach; 6. Non-retributive safeguards of due process; 7. Victims; 8. Public protection and implementation; References; Index.

'Shaw extensively develops an engaging argument for making substantial reforms to our criminal justice systems. Starting with the claim that we can all agree on – that for any proposed justification for criminal sanctions, there are reasons to doubt it – while acknowledging that there is widespread disagreement about which particular view is correct, Shaw explores what else we can agree on, and what implications this has for criminal justice systems. The argument's ecumenical nature means that theorists of all stripes can find much of interest, and much to grapple with, in this book.' Gabriel De Marco, University of Oxford

Elizabeth Shaw is Senior Lecturer in Law at The University of Aberdeen. She is the co-editor of Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society (Cambridge, 2019), and The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment (2021).

• 1. Doubts about the justification of criminal sanctions; 2. The epistemic challenge to retributivism; 3. Evaluating retributivists' responses to the epistemic challenge; 4. Expanding the scope of the epistemic argument to cover nonpunitive incapacitation; 5. The convergence approach; 6. Non-retributive safeguards of due process; 7. Victims; 8. Public protection and implementation; References; Index.

'Shaw extensively develops an engaging argument for making substantial reforms to our criminal justice systems. Starting with the claim that we can all agree on – that for any proposed justification for criminal sanctions, there are reasons to doubt it – while acknowledging that there is widespread disagreement about which particular view is correct, Shaw explores what else we can agree on, and what implications this has for criminal justice systems. The argument's ecumenical nature means that theorists of all stripes can find much of interest, and much to grapple with, in this book.' Gabriel De Marco, University of Oxford

Elizabeth Shaw is Senior Lecturer in Law at The University of Aberdeen. She is the co-editor of Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society (Cambridge, 2019), and The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment (2021).

• 1. Doubts about the justification of criminal sanctions; 2. The epistemic challenge to retributivism; 3. Evaluating retributivists' responses to the epistemic challenge; 4. Expanding the scope of the epistemic argument to cover nonpunitive incapacitation; 5. The convergence approach; 6. Non-retributive safeguards of due process; 7. Victims; 8. Public protection and implementation; References; Index.

'Shaw extensively develops an engaging argument for making substantial reforms to our criminal justice systems. Starting with the claim that we can all agree on – that for any proposed justification for criminal sanctions, there are reasons to doubt it – while acknowledging that there is widespread disagreement about which particular view is correct, Shaw explores what else we can agree on, and what implications this has for criminal justice systems. The argument's ecumenical nature means that theorists of all stripes can find much of interest, and much to grapple with, in this book.' Gabriel De Marco, University of Oxford