Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

Inbunden, Engelska, 2017

AvTodd S. Sechser,Matthew Fuhrmann

1 299 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar. Fri frakt för medlemmar vid köp för minst 249 kr.

Finns i fler format (1)

Häftad

439 kr

Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2017-02-02
Mått160 x 235 x 22 mm
Vikt590 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor343
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9781107106949

Tillhör följande kategorier

Part I. The Logic of Nuclear Skepticism: 1. Nuclear blackmail in international politics; 2. Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism; Part II. Trends: 3. Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining; 4. Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics; Part III. Cases: 5. Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails; 6. Think again: reassessing nuclear victories; Part IV. Conclusions: 7. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality.

'This fascinating book is, I believe intentionally, more provocative than merely persuasive, more skeptical than most among us are. It looks at the history of international negotiation, both explicit and by maneuver, in the presence of nuclear weapons and concludes that disparities in nuclear armaments - including zero on one side - make much less difference than they are given credit for. If the argument doesn't persuade you, the forty case studies of nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining (eleven involving the United States) will make you think it over.' Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences

Mer från samma författare

Emerging Technologies and International Stability

Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, Caitlin Talmadge, USA) Narang, Neil (University of California Santa Barbara, USA.) Talmadge, Caitlin (Georgetown University

Inbunden

2 739 kr

Emerging Technologies and International Stability

Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, Caitlin Talmadge, USA) Narang, Neil (University of California Santa Barbara, USA.) Talmadge, Caitlin (Georgetown University

Häftad

809 kr

Du kanske också är intresserad av