Monopsony in Labor Markets

Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy

Inbunden, Engelska, 2024

Av Brianna L. Alderman, Roger D. Blair, Brianna L Alderman, Roger D Blair

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The economics of monopsony power results in lower wages and other forms of compensation, as well as reduced employment. Wealth is transferred from workers to their employers. In addition, the employer's output is reduced, which leads to increased prices for consumers. Monopsony in Labor Markets demonstrates that elements of monopsony are pervasive and explores the available antitrust policy options. It presents the economic and empirical foundations for antitrust concerns and sets out the relevant antitrust policy. Building on this foundation, it examines collusion on compensation, collusive no-poaching agreements, and the inclusion of non-compete agreements in employment contracts. It also addresses the influence of labor unions, labor's antitrust exemption, which permits the exercise of countervailing power, and the consequences of mergers to monopsony. Offering a thorough explanation of antitrust policy, this book identifies the basic economic problems with monopsony in labor markets and explains the remedies currently available.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2024-02-15
Mått160 x 235 x 18 mm
Vikt453 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor212
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9781009465229

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Brianna L. Alderman is a Theodore H. Ashford Fellow at Harvard University. She is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Economics at Harvard University and currently holds bachelor's degrees in Economics, Mathematics, and Statistics from the University of Florida. Her current field interests include industrial organization, labor economics, and antitrust economics. Roger D. Blair is a Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. His research and teaching centers around antitrust economics. He has coauthored Monopsony in Law and Economics, Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets, Antitrust Economics, and The Economics of Franchising. He has published over 200 articles in Economics journals and law reviews.

'Monopsony in Labor Markets is an excellent, empirically rich, and modestly technical treatment of a subject that will be especially helpful to antitrust lawyers and economists trying to sort out the effects of monopsony power on labor. The authors include full chapters on wage collusion and no poach agreements, noncompete agreements, and mergers. This book is particularly useful on questions like the extent and measurement of labor market concentration and power, tradeoffs between output and input effects, and the role of efficiencies. A must-read for an antitrust era in which harm to workers has suddenly become important.' Herbert Hovenkamp, Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School