Häftad, Engelska, 2005
Del i serien Studies in Asian Security
Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security
509 kr
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Beskrivning
In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.
Produktinformation
- Utgivningsdatum: 2005-11-23
- Mått: 152 x 229 x 15 mm
- Vikt: 354 g
- Format: Häftad
- Språk: Engelska
- Serie: Studies in Asian Security
- Antal sidor: 264
- Förlag: Stanford University Press
- ISBN: 9780804752565
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Mer information
Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.
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