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Anglo-American theoreticians have to a large extent dominated the formulation and study of modern naval strategy in Western countries. This Anglo-American dominance has resulted in a focus on how the superior power should exploit its superiority in order to realize its strategic objectives. The present study differs from other books on naval strategy by analysing a military strategy for the inferior power instead. Along with Tirpitz’s “risk theory”, The Jeune École is the most significant maritime strategy dealing with the dilemmas facing the weaker navy. This French body of naval thought is distinguished from other strategies of the weak by its elaborate prescriptions for the offensive use of naval forces. This book represents an unprecedented study of The Jeune École based on hitherto unexploited and unpublished primary sources from the Service Historique de la Marine.
Arne Røksund, Ph. D. (2005) in History, University of Oslo, is Rear Admiral and Commander of the Norwegian Defence Education Command and Commandant of the Norwegian National Defence College.
Acknowledgements .. viiIntroduction .. ixChapter One The Theoretical Foundation of the Jeune École .. 1The Predecessor of the Jeune École .. 1Strategic Assessment .. 7Commercial Warfare .. 13Raiding the Enemy’s Sea Lines of Communication .. 13Bombardment of the Enemy’s Coast .. 21The Jeune École and International Law .. 24The Critics of the Jeune École .. 24International Law Incompatible with War .. 27Limited War or Total War—Impacts on Military Thinking .. 35From Cabinet War to the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars .. 38The American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War .. 45Summary .. 50Chapter Two The Jeune École in Office .. 53Strategic Assessment .. 53Verifying the Excellence of the Torpedo Boats .. 63Rapprochement between Aube and the Council of Admiralty .. 77Summary .. 81Chapter Three The Legacy of the Jeune École .. 85The Strategic Outlook of the French Navy up to the Fashoda Crisis .. 86The Disciples of Aube .. 97Total War and International Law .. 98The Potential Enemies .. 100The Naval Programme of the Heirs .. 105 The Return of the Jeune École to Power .. 109The Jeune École and the Staff College .. 111From Lockroy’s First Period as Minister of Marine to the Fashoda Crisis .. 130Summary .. 137Chapter Four The Fashoda Crisis and the Development of a Modern Navy .. 143Confrontation Between France and Great Britain .. 143Italy, the Perfect Enemy .. 156After Fashoda .. 161Lanessan’s Analysis .. 161The Reform .. 165Summary .. 174Chapter Five The Revitalisation of the Jeune École .. 177Changing Alliances among the European Powers .. 177The Submarine and the Jeune École .. 189The Pelletan Regime .. 213Summary .. 221Conclusion .. 225Appendix: Ministers of Marine 1870–1914 .. 231Bibliography .. 233Index .. 239
“This book provides the English language reader with the only up-to-date study of this curious development since the appearance of Theodore Ropp’s dissertation-turned-book. Røksund has made some significant additions by using primary sources in the French Navy’s archives which were closed to Ropp when he did his research in the 1930s. The result is a tight story which begins with the French Navy’s surrender of her budget to finance the rebuilding of the Army after 1870 and ends with the emergence of the submarine as the first viable weapon to do what the Jeune École proposed-wage a guerre de course.”Chalmers Hood in Journal of Military History 72/1, Jan 2008