Government and Markets

Edward J. Balleisen is Associate Professor of History at Duke University, where he teaches American business history and American legal history. He specializes in the evolving 'culture of American capitalism' - the institutions, values and practices that have both structured and constrained commercial activity. The author of Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy and Commercial Society in Antebellum America and Scenes from a Corporate Makeover: Columbia/HCA and Heathcare Fraud, 1992–2001, he has also published in numerous journals, including Business History Review, Australian Journal of Legal History and Reviews in American History. In 2005, he was awarded the Howard D. Johnson Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching. He received his PhD in history from Yale University. He is currently working on a history of commercial fraud in the United States, focusing on organizational fraud against consumers and investors, from the early nineteenth century to the present. David A. Moss is the John G. McLean Professor at Harvard Business School, where he teaches in the business, government and international economy area. Professor Moss's research focuses on economic policy and especially the government's role as a risk manager. He has published three books on these subjects: Socializing Security: Progressive-Era Economists and the Origins of American Social Policy (1996), When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (2002) and A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know (2007). Professor Moss is the founder of the Tobin Project, a non-profit research organization, and a member of the National Academy of Social Insurance. Recent honors include the Robert F. Greenhill Award, the Editors' Prize from the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, the Student Association Faculty Award for outstanding teaching at the Harvard Business School and the American Risk and Insurance Association's Annual Kulp-Wright Book Award for the 'most influential text published on the economics of risk management and insurance'. He received his PhD from Yale University in 1992.

• Introduction; Part I. Beyond Market Failure: 1. Government failure vs. market failure: principles of regulation Joseph E. Stiglitz; 2. Effective regulation through credible cost-benefit analysis: the opportunity costs of superfund Michael Greenstone; 3. From 'state interference' to the 'return to the market': the rhetoric of economic regulation from the old Gilded Age to the new Mary O. Furner; 4. Lessons from Europe: some reflections on the European Union and the regulation of business Neil Fligstein; 5. Confidence games: how does regulation constitute markets? Daniel Carpenter; Part II. Beyond the Economic Theory of Politics: 6. The end of special interests theory and the beginning of a more positive view of democratic politics Donald Wittman; 7. Public choice: a critical reassessment Jessica Leight; 8. The paranoid style in the study of American politics David A. Moss and Mary Oey; 9. Law, policy, and cooperation Yochai Benkler; Part III. Beyond Command and Control: 10. What opportunity is knocking? Regulating corporate governance in the United States Mary A. O'Sullivan; 11. Taxation as a regulatory tool: lessons from environmental taxes in Europe Monica Prasad; 12. Redesigning regulation: a case study from the consumer credit market Elizabeth Warren; 13. Origins and regulatory consequences of the subprime crisis Barry Eichengreen; 14. Prospects for economic 'self-regulation' in the United States: an historian's view from the early twenty-first century Edward J. Balleisen; 15. Deregulation theories in a litigious society: American antitrust and tort Tony Freyer; 16. Markets in the shadow of the state: an appraisal of deregulation and implications for future research Marc Allen Eisner; Conclusion.

Review of the hardback: 'The heritage of James Tobin is well represented by this outstanding volume. The authors analyze the relations of government and the market from many different angles, showing the fallacies of simple critiques on the basis of deep scholarship.' Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University