"James Sadkovich’s wide-ranging and meticulously researched study challenges a wide range of common tropes and conventional understandings of Fascist Italy’s experience of World War Two. Time-honoured traditions of looking to cultural and structural reasons, Fascist politics and policy, Mussolini’s own misguided hand, or simple and inherent Italian incompetence as explanations of the nation’s difficulties during the war are challenged. And they are challenged hard! So too the impact of an all-too common conflation of the nature of Fascist Italy with Nazi Germany, and the temptation to measure or judge both against each other, despite the profound differences between the regimes during the lead up and conduct of the war. In their place the author scrutinizes the very sinews of the Italian state and its objective capacity to wage a modern, industrial war from 1940. That is, raw materials, industrial and production potential, finance, trade, real diplomatic objectives, and a range of other measurable, empirical strategic conundrums – many of which predated Mussolini’s regime and existed, immutable, despite Fascist rhetoric. You do not need to agree with the arguments herein. Indeed, some readers may feel a little uncomfortable. I encourage you, however, to engage with this work. Only by constant contestation of established wisdom does history and understanding move forward. On such a basis, and with my own views on Italy’s war rattled, I highly recommend the read."Craig Stockings, Head of School, Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW Canberra"In content, methodology and interpretation, James J. Sadkovich’s new work is the most incisive and original book on Italian Fascism to have appeared in recent years. Author of the basic one-volume history of the Italian navy in World War II, as well as numerous other works, Sadkovich has devoted many years of study to this area and offers a unique account of the material basis of the Italian military effort in World War II, based on thorough and conclusive research.This account begins with a highly original critique of theory and interpretation concerning Italian Fascism, and then brings together analysis of economics, production, weapons systems, raw material resources and planning to provide a new understanding of Italian participation in the conflict. It analyzes the basis of Mussolini’s war, and treats with objectivity and originality such vexed issues as “fascist economics” and the problematic question of Italian armored warfare. This unique new work is indispensable for the study of Italy’s role in the war and of the Mediterranean theater in general."Stanley G. Payne, University of Wisconsin-Madison