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The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although rent seeking can also take place in personal relations and within firms and bureaucracies. The contributions in this outstanding volume provide an accompaniment or 'companion' to the literature on rent seeking and the related political economy of rent creation and extraction. The chapters, written by leading scholars in the field, demonstrate the centrality of rent-related incentives to the study of economics, politics, culture, public administration and history.The expert and original contributions summarize and extend the literature in both theoretical and applied areas of research. The book begins with a clear and comprehensive description of the theory of rent seeking and of contest design for political and bureaucratic rent extraction. This is followed by a series of case studies showing the relevance of rent seeking for regulatory policies, international-trade policies, public finance, natural-resource discoveries, development aid, behavior in international bureaucracies, litigation and judicial systems. The applied chapters also include overviews of rent seeking and rent extraction in Europe, Russia, Asia, Africa and the US.This volume will appeal to a broad readership, including economists, political scientists and development practitioners, wishing to gain an understanding of the concept of rent seeking. The chapters in this book also provide an excellent introduction to the extensive literature.Contributors:
Edited by Roger D. Congleton, BB&T Professor of Economics, West Virginia University, US and Arye L. Hillman, William Gittes Chair, Professor of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Contents:PART I: INTRODUCTION1. The Nature of Rent SeekingRoger D. Congleton 2. Rent Seeking as Political Economy Arye L. HillmanPART II: THEORY3. The Theory of Contests: A Unified Model and Review of the Literature Ngo Van Long4. Contestable Policies Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan5. Asymmetries in Rent Seeking Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Eric Langlais, Bruno Lovat, and Francesco Parisi6. Prize-sharing Rules in Collective Rent Seeking Sabine Flamand and Orestis Troumpounis7. Rent Seeking and Organizational Structure Karl Wärneryd8. Contest Effort Yosef Mealem and Shmuel Nitzan9. Sabotage in Contests J. Atsu Amegashie10. Behavioral Dimensions of Contests Roman M. SheremetaPART III: APPLICATIONS AND OUTCOMES11. Regulatory Rent Seeking William F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas12. Rents and International Trade Policy Arye L. Hillman13. Rent Seeking Through Public Finance Michael Brooks14. Rent Seeking and the Resource Curse Robert T. Deacon and Ashwin Rode15. Rents and the Political Economy of Development AidRune Jansen Hagen16. Rent Seeking in International Organizations Roland Vaubel17. Litigation as Rent SeekingFrancesco Parisi and Barbara LuppiPART IV: THE REALITY OF RENTS18. Profit Seeking and Rent Seeking in the United States and Europe Dennis C. Mueller19. Rents in a Welfare State Martin Paldam20. Rent Seeking Through Control of the State in Russia Mark I. Levin and Georgy A. Satarov21. Rents and Development Failure in Africa John Mukum Mbaku and Mwangi S. Kimenyi22. Economic Development and Corruption in China in the Shadow of Rent Seeking Kang Chen and Liu Qijung23. Market Liberalization and Rent Seeking in India Sugata Marjit and Vivekananda Mukherjee24. The Democratization of Rent Seeking in Modern Greece Thomas Moutos and Lambros Pechlivanos25. Rent Seeking in the Democracy of Ancient Greece George TridimasPART IV: CONSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 26. Rent Seeking and Constitutional Political Economy Randall G. Holcombe27. Rent Seeking and Organizational Governance: Limiting the Losses from Intra-organizational ConflictRoger D. CongletonIndex
‘This twenty-seven chapter book provides an excellent and accessible overview of the literature on rent seeking since its inception. What makes the book a fascinating reading is its application to different areas, such as regulation and economic aid, and presentation of an array of highly readable cases studies, including on China, Greece, India and Russia. It is a must for both students of public finance and policy makers.’