Jon Bornholdt, Ph.D. (2016) is a lecturer in logic and philosophy at the University of Würzburg, Germany.

• ContentsAcknowledgements ixExplanation of Symbols xCitation Style xiiList of Figures xiii1 Introduction: History and Logical Analysis of the Problem 11 The Heart of the Problem: A Question of Truth-Makers andTruth-Bearers 12 Models of the World and Theories of Truth 62.1 Two Models of the World 82.2 Fitting Truth Operators to Ontology: The CorrespondenceAssumption 123 Either the Fallibility of God as Foreknower, or the Necessitation ofCreaturely Action: Sophismata or Genuine Puzzles? 153.1 A “First Try”: The Appeal to Scope Disambiguation 163.2 The Inadequacy of the Sophismatic Solution 214 The Boethian Analysis and Its Influence 284.1 Boethius’ Slippery T2 Theory: “Broad Bivalence” and the OperatorsDefinite and Indefinite 294.2 The Assertability Conditions of the Boethian Future Tense(s) 344.3 A Fruitful Ambiguity: Simple vs. Conditional Necessity 374.4 From the Commentary Theory to the Consolation Theory 434.5 The Boethian or Logical-Compatibilist Model 494.6 Historical Developments: Further Applications of the System 615 Overcoming the Limitations of Logical Compatibilism: The Need forAlternative Real Futures 815.1 Making Room for Divine (and More Room for Human) Freedom:God’s “Power over the Past” and the Divine Modal Pleroma 835.2 The System of Duns Scotus 976 The (Re)Turn to the Formal: Thomas Wylton, Peter Auriol, and theRejection of the Correspondence Assumption 1166.1 The Wylton Scope Analysis 1166.2 The Position of Peter Auriol: A Closed-Future Model inOpen-Future Guise 1247 The System(s) of William Ockham 1447.1 Determinate Truth and the Mystery of God’s MysteriousForeknowledge 1457.2 Ockham’s Open Future 1487.3 Ockham’s Later Influence: The Communis Opinio 1638 Ponere [in Esse]: Drifting between the Derivational, the Temporal,and the Ludic 1658.1 Ponere [in Esse]: Initial Approaches 1658.2 Arnold of Strelley and Obligational Theology 1678.3 Ponere [in Esse] in Sense i: Assumptions and/or Actions 1738.4 Ponere [in Esse] in Sense ii: The Real Occurrence of a Given Res /Proposition 1748.5 Ponere [in Esse]: A Unifying Interpretation? 1769 Recapitulation 17710 Walter Chatton on Future Contingents 17810.1 Chatton’s Reportatio super Sententias 17910.2 Chatton’s Quodlibet 23311 Concluding Remarks: Chatton in Historical Context 2592 Translations of Chatton’s Reportatio super Sententias i, dd. 38–41 andQuodlibet, qq. 27–29 265Reportatio super Sententias i 265Distinction 38. Unique Question. Whether the Contingency ofFutures is Consistent with God’s Knowledge of FutureContingents 265Distinction 39. Unique Question. Whether God Could Know MoreThan He Knows 279Distinctions 40–41. Question 1. Whether the Mystery of the DivineIncarnation was the Meriting Cause of HumanPredestination 286Distinctions 40–41. Question 2. Whether It Can be ConsistentlyMaintained Both That God Wills That a Shall be Necessarily, andThat a Will Nevertheless Happen Contingently 311Quodlibet 318Question 27. Whether Any Creature Could be Apprised of a FutureContingent 318Question 28. Whether the Certainty of Revelation of FutureContingents is Compatible with Their Contingency 331Question 29. Whether All Forms of the Arguments Which NormallyOccur in This Matter Can be Resolved 3423 Commentary 344Reportatio super Sententias i 344Distinction 38. Unique Question: Whether the Contingency ofFutures is Consistent with God’s Knowledge of FutureContingents 344Distinction 39. Unique Question: Whether God Could Know MoreThan He Knows 368Distinctions 40–41 380Question 1. Whether the Mystery of the Divine Incarnation was theMeriting Cause of Human Predestination. 381Question 2. Whether It Can be Consistently Maintained Both ThatGod Wills That a Shall be Necessarily, and That a Will NeverthelessHappen Contingently 411Quodlibet 424Question 27. Whether Any Creature Could be Apprised of a FutureContingent 425Question 28. Whether the Certainty of Revelation of FutureContingents is Compatible with Their Contingency 445Question 29. Whether All Forms of the Arguments Which NormallyOccur in this Matter Can be Resolved 467Appendix: Natural-Deduction Derivations of the PatternArguments 469Bibliography 509Index of Names 528Subject Index 531

Jon Bornholdt, Ph.D. (2016) is a lecturer in logic and philosophy at the University of Würzburg, Germany.

• ContentsAcknowledgements ixExplanation of Symbols xCitation Style xiiList of Figures xiii1 Introduction: History and Logical Analysis of the Problem 11 The Heart of the Problem: A Question of Truth-Makers andTruth-Bearers 12 Models of the World and Theories of Truth 62.1 Two Models of the World 82.2 Fitting Truth Operators to Ontology: The CorrespondenceAssumption 123 Either the Fallibility of God as Foreknower, or the Necessitation ofCreaturely Action: Sophismata or Genuine Puzzles? 153.1 A “First Try”: The Appeal to Scope Disambiguation 163.2 The Inadequacy of the Sophismatic Solution 214 The Boethian Analysis and Its Influence 284.1 Boethius’ Slippery T2 Theory: “Broad Bivalence” and the OperatorsDefinite and Indefinite 294.2 The Assertability Conditions of the Boethian Future Tense(s) 344.3 A Fruitful Ambiguity: Simple vs. Conditional Necessity 374.4 From the Commentary Theory to the Consolation Theory 434.5 The Boethian or Logical-Compatibilist Model 494.6 Historical Developments: Further Applications of the System 615 Overcoming the Limitations of Logical Compatibilism: The Need forAlternative Real Futures 815.1 Making Room for Divine (and More Room for Human) Freedom:God’s “Power over the Past” and the Divine Modal Pleroma 835.2 The System of Duns Scotus 976 The (Re)Turn to the Formal: Thomas Wylton, Peter Auriol, and theRejection of the Correspondence Assumption 1166.1 The Wylton Scope Analysis 1166.2 The Position of Peter Auriol: A Closed-Future Model inOpen-Future Guise 1247 The System(s) of William Ockham 1447.1 Determinate Truth and the Mystery of God’s MysteriousForeknowledge 1457.2 Ockham’s Open Future 1487.3 Ockham’s Later Influence: The Communis Opinio 1638 Ponere [in Esse]: Drifting between the Derivational, the Temporal,and the Ludic 1658.1 Ponere [in Esse]: Initial Approaches 1658.2 Arnold of Strelley and Obligational Theology 1678.3 Ponere [in Esse] in Sense i: Assumptions and/or Actions 1738.4 Ponere [in Esse] in Sense ii: The Real Occurrence of a Given Res /Proposition 1748.5 Ponere [in Esse]: A Unifying Interpretation? 1769 Recapitulation 17710 Walter Chatton on Future Contingents 17810.1 Chatton’s Reportatio super Sententias 17910.2 Chatton’s Quodlibet 23311 Concluding Remarks: Chatton in Historical Context 2592 Translations of Chatton’s Reportatio super Sententias i, dd. 38–41 andQuodlibet, qq. 27–29 265Reportatio super Sententias i 265Distinction 38. Unique Question. Whether the Contingency ofFutures is Consistent with God’s Knowledge of FutureContingents 265Distinction 39. Unique Question. Whether God Could Know MoreThan He Knows 279Distinctions 40–41. Question 1. Whether the Mystery of the DivineIncarnation was the Meriting Cause of HumanPredestination 286Distinctions 40–41. Question 2. Whether It Can be ConsistentlyMaintained Both That God Wills That a Shall be Necessarily, andThat a Will Nevertheless Happen Contingently 311Quodlibet 318Question 27. Whether Any Creature Could be Apprised of a FutureContingent 318Question 28. Whether the Certainty of Revelation of FutureContingents is Compatible with Their Contingency 331Question 29. Whether All Forms of the Arguments Which NormallyOccur in This Matter Can be Resolved 3423 Commentary 344Reportatio super Sententias i 344Distinction 38. Unique Question: Whether the Contingency ofFutures is Consistent with God’s Knowledge of FutureContingents 344Distinction 39. Unique Question: Whether God Could Know MoreThan He Knows 368Distinctions 40–41 380Question 1. Whether the Mystery of the Divine Incarnation was theMeriting Cause of Human Predestination. 381Question 2. Whether It Can be Consistently Maintained Both ThatGod Wills That a Shall be Necessarily, and That a Will NeverthelessHappen Contingently 411Quodlibet 424Question 27. Whether Any Creature Could be Apprised of a FutureContingent 425Question 28. Whether the Certainty of Revelation of FutureContingents is Compatible with Their Contingency 445Question 29. Whether All Forms of the Arguments Which NormallyOccur in this Matter Can be Resolved 467Appendix: Natural-Deduction Derivations of the PatternArguments 469Bibliography 509Index of Names 528Subject Index 531

Jon Bornholdt, Ph.D. (2016) is a lecturer in logic and philosophy at the University of Würzburg, Germany.

• ContentsAcknowledgements ixExplanation of Symbols xCitation Style xiiList of Figures xiii1 Introduction: History and Logical Analysis of the Problem 11 The Heart of the Problem: A Question of Truth-Makers andTruth-Bearers 12 Models of the World and Theories of Truth 62.1 Two Models of the World 82.2 Fitting Truth Operators to Ontology: The CorrespondenceAssumption 123 Either the Fallibility of God as Foreknower, or the Necessitation ofCreaturely Action: Sophismata or Genuine Puzzles? 153.1 A “First Try”: The Appeal to Scope Disambiguation 163.2 The Inadequacy of the Sophismatic Solution 214 The Boethian Analysis and Its Influence 284.1 Boethius’ Slippery T2 Theory: “Broad Bivalence” and the OperatorsDefinite and Indefinite 294.2 The Assertability Conditions of the Boethian Future Tense(s) 344.3 A Fruitful Ambiguity: Simple vs. Conditional Necessity 374.4 From the Commentary Theory to the Consolation Theory 434.5 The Boethian or Logical-Compatibilist Model 494.6 Historical Developments: Further Applications of the System 615 Overcoming the Limitations of Logical Compatibilism: The Need forAlternative Real Futures 815.1 Making Room for Divine (and More Room for Human) Freedom:God’s “Power over the Past” and the Divine Modal Pleroma 835.2 The System of Duns Scotus 976 The (Re)Turn to the Formal: Thomas Wylton, Peter Auriol, and theRejection of the Correspondence Assumption 1166.1 The Wylton Scope Analysis 1166.2 The Position of Peter Auriol: A Closed-Future Model inOpen-Future Guise 1247 The System(s) of William Ockham 1447.1 Determinate Truth and the Mystery of God’s MysteriousForeknowledge 1457.2 Ockham’s Open Future 1487.3 Ockham’s Later Influence: The Communis Opinio 1638 Ponere [in Esse]: Drifting between the Derivational, the Temporal,and the Ludic 1658.1 Ponere [in Esse]: Initial Approaches 1658.2 Arnold of Strelley and Obligational Theology 1678.3 Ponere [in Esse] in Sense i: Assumptions and/or Actions 1738.4 Ponere [in Esse] in Sense ii: The Real Occurrence of a Given Res /Proposition 1748.5 Ponere [in Esse]: A Unifying Interpretation? 1769 Recapitulation 17710 Walter Chatton on Future Contingents 17810.1 Chatton’s Reportatio super Sententias 17910.2 Chatton’s Quodlibet 23311 Concluding Remarks: Chatton in Historical Context 2592 Translations of Chatton’s Reportatio super Sententias i, dd. 38–41 andQuodlibet, qq. 27–29 265Reportatio super Sententias i 265Distinction 38. Unique Question. Whether the Contingency ofFutures is Consistent with God’s Knowledge of FutureContingents 265Distinction 39. Unique Question. Whether God Could Know MoreThan He Knows 279Distinctions 40–41. Question 1. Whether the Mystery of the DivineIncarnation was the Meriting Cause of HumanPredestination 286Distinctions 40–41. Question 2. Whether It Can be ConsistentlyMaintained Both That God Wills That a Shall be Necessarily, andThat a Will Nevertheless Happen Contingently 311Quodlibet 318Question 27. Whether Any Creature Could be Apprised of a FutureContingent 318Question 28. Whether the Certainty of Revelation of FutureContingents is Compatible with Their Contingency 331Question 29. Whether All Forms of the Arguments Which NormallyOccur in This Matter Can be Resolved 3423 Commentary 344Reportatio super Sententias i 344Distinction 38. Unique Question: Whether the Contingency ofFutures is Consistent with God’s Knowledge of FutureContingents 344Distinction 39. Unique Question: Whether God Could Know MoreThan He Knows 368Distinctions 40–41 380Question 1. Whether the Mystery of the Divine Incarnation was theMeriting Cause of Human Predestination. 381Question 2. Whether It Can be Consistently Maintained Both ThatGod Wills That a Shall be Necessarily, and That a Will NeverthelessHappen Contingently 411Quodlibet 424Question 27. Whether Any Creature Could be Apprised of a FutureContingent 425Question 28. Whether the Certainty of Revelation of FutureContingents is Compatible with Their Contingency 445Question 29. Whether All Forms of the Arguments Which NormallyOccur in this Matter Can be Resolved 467Appendix: Natural-Deduction Derivations of the PatternArguments 469Bibliography 509Index of Names 528Subject Index 531