This Is Ethics

Jussi Suikkanen is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham, UK. He has contributed numerous articles on metaethics and normative ethics in journals such as The Philosophical Quarterly, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

• Preface xvAcknowledgments xixPart One What’s in Our Interests? 11 Pleasure 3Three Questions about Pleasure 4What Is Pleasure? 6The sensation view 7The attitude view 7The desire view 8Physiology of pleasure* 10Value of Pleasure 11Hedonism 12Argument in favor of hedonism 1: Discernible differences 13Argument in favor of hedonism 2: Motivation 13Higher pleasures 13Pluralism about prudential value 15Nozick’s experience machine argument 15Two responses to Nozick 16Pessimism about the value of pleasure* 17Summary and Questions 19Annotated Bibliography 20Online Resources 222 Happiness, Well-being, and the Meaning of Life 25Hedonism, Again 27Objection 1: Trivial pleasures 28Objection 2: The role of happiness in deliberation 28Satisfaction Theories 29Desire satisfaction theories of well-being 29Objections to desire satisfaction theories 30Objection 1: Which desires count? 30Objection 2: Expensive tastes 31Life satisfaction theories of happiness 32An objection to life satisfaction theories 33Objective List Theories 34Objections to the objective list theories 35The Capability Approach* 37Happiness and the Meaning of Life 39Emotional state theory of happiness* 40The question of the meaning of life 41Susan Wolf ’s fitting fulfillment theory 42Summary and Questions 43Annotated Bibliography 44Online Resources 47Part Two Normative Ethics 513 Egoism and Altruism 53Different Forms of Egoism and Altruism 55Feldman’s objection to ethical egoism 56Two Arguments for Ethical Egoism 57The “ought implies can” argument 58The practical reasons argument 58Two Objections to Psychological Egoism 59The everyday objection 59The evolutionary objection 60Moore’s Argument against Ethical Egoism* 62Problems of Moore’s argument* 63Gauthier’s Contractarianism 64The paradox of social cooperation 65Contractarianism as a solution 67The compliance problem 68Reason one: Risk of exclusion 69Reason two: Risk of revealing your true motives 69Summary 69Problems with Gauthier’s Theory 70Objection 1: Scope of moral concern 70Objection 2: Deception 70Objection 3: Acting for right reasons 71Summary and Questions 71Annotated Bibliography 73Online Resources 754 Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 79Consequentialism 80Utilitarianism 82Deliberation procedure vs. criterion of rightness 83Direct vs. indirect forms of consequentialism 83Utilitarianism vs. richer conceptions of value 84Actual vs. expected value 85Maximizing vs. satisficing 86Mill’s Argument for Utilitarianism 86The problems with Mill’s argument 88Saving Mill’s argument 89Kantian Ethics 90The good will 90The universalization test 92Duties, right and wrong 94Why do the right thing? 95Reason 1: Exceptions 95Reason 2: Freedom 96Counterexamples and Convergence 97Counterexamples to utilitarianism 98Counterexamples to the Categorical Imperative 99Utilitarian and consequentialist responses to the counterexamples* 100Kantian responses to the counterexamples* 102Convergence* 104Summary and Questions 105Annotated Bibliography 106Online Resources 1095 Intuitionism, Particularism, and Virtue Ethics 113Ross’s Objection to Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 113Intuitionism in Normative Ethics 115Prima facie duties 115How do you know? 117Prima facie duties and actual duties 118Particularism 120Prima facie duties and holism 120Holism and particularism* 121Knowing what is right* 123Virtue Ethics 124Flourishing 125Virtue acquisition 127Acting virtuously 128Right and wrong acts 129Two Objections to Virtue Ethics 130Circularity 130Improving yourself 131Virtue ethics and moral sensibility 131Summary and Questions 133Annotated Bibliography 134Online Resources 136Part Three Metaethics 1396 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Divine Commands 141Subjectivism 143Advantages of subjectivism 144Objections to subjectivism 144Objection 1: Experience 145Objection 2: Infallibility 145Objection 3: Disagreement 145Relativism 146Advantages of relativism 148Problems of relativism 149Problem 1: Disagreement 149Problem 2: Moral fallibility 150Problem 3: Tolerance 150Problem 4: Multiculturalism 151Divine Command Theory 151Divine command theory and moral words 151Divine command theory and moral properties 153Advantages of divine command theory 154The Euthyphro Dilemma* 155What is right explains what God commands* 156God’s commands explain what is right* 156Problem 1: God’s goodness 157Problem 2: Anything could be wrong 157Problem 3: The reasons for God’s commands 158Summary and Questions 158Annotated Bibliography 159Online Resources 1637 Naturalism and the Open Question Argument 167Moral Realism 167Naturalism vs. non-naturalism 168Pros and cons of non-naturalism 169The Open Question Argument 171Stage 1: Words and properties 172Stage 2: Moral words and moral properties 173Stage 3: The open question test 173Stage 4: Moral words and open questions 174Stage 5: Putting the argument together 175Responses to the Open Question Argument 176Response 1: Begging the question 176Response 2: Making know-how explicit 177Response 3: The sense/reference distinction 179Intuitionism in Metaethics* 181The problem of knowledge* 181Foundationalism to the rescue* 183Misconceptions and objections* 184Misconception 1: The role of experience and emotions 184Misconception 2: What seems self-evident to you 184Objection 1: People who understand but don’t agree 185Objection 2: Dogmatism 186Summary and Questions 186Annotated Bibliography 187Online Resources 1908 Moral Motivation and Expressivism 195The Argument from Motivation 196The Humean Theory of Motivation 197Directions of fit 197The role of beliefs and desires 198Moral Judgment Internalism 199Very Strong Internalism 200Weakness of will 201Strong Internalism 201Counterexamples to Strong Internalism 202Amoralists 202Bad people 203A case of depression 204Expressivism 205The core claims of expressivism 206Claim 1: Moral judgments 207Claim 2: Moral language 208Claim 3: Moral properties 210Responses to two common objections 211Objection 1: Truths and facts 211Objection 2: Mere attitudes 211The Frege–Geach Problem 212Embedded claims 212Valid inferences* 213The negation problem* 214Summary and Questions 215Annotated Bibliography 217Online Resources 220Part Four Ethical Questions 2239 Moral Responsibility 225What Is Moral Responsibility? 225Causal responsibility and attributability 227The agency condition 227Freedom and real selves 229The Freedom Principle: A Threat for Moral Responsibility 230The consequence argument 230The problem of luck 231Galen Strawson’s argument against moral responsibility 232The Frankfurt Cases 234Objections and responses* 235Objection 1: Flicker of freedom 235Objection 2: A dilemma 235Response 1: Mele and Robb 236Response 2: Dennett 236The Deep Attributability Principle 237Frankfurt’s higher-order desire theory 238The Real Self 239Watson’s theory of the real self 240The time-slice problem 241Responsiveness to reasons 242Summary and Questions 243Annotated Bibliography 244Online Resources 24710 Population Growth and Climate Change 249The Non-Identity Effect 251The Repugnant Conclusion 253The average utility principle 256Critical-level utilitarianism* 257Variable value view and intuitions* 259Climate Change and Personal Obligations 260Carbon off setting 261Climate Change and Governments 262The discount rate* 264The social action problem 266Climate Change and Uncertainty 267Maximizing expected value* 268Summary and Questions 269Annotated Bibliography 271Online Resources 272Glossary of Terms 275Index 293