The Reciprocity Trap

While ethnic voting is usually linked with stable voting patterns, Indian elections are notoriously fragmented and difficult to predict. The Reciprocity Trap argues that the instability of Indian elections can largely be attributed to the weakness and mobilizational strategy of political parties, which leads to the under-mobilization of the poor. Using an impressive array of data, ranging from geo-coded polling station data to elite interviews, Pradeep Chhibber and Francesca Jensenius show how the poor are more likely to shift their allegiance between elections, to "waste" their vote on unviable contenders, and less likely to participate in all forms of political activities. This groundbreaking work reintegrates class and economic status into the study of South Asian politics, which has long been dominated by discussions of identity politics, showing that while identity groups may provide a stable source of support for parties, the volatile choices of the under-mobilized poor ultimately determine who wins elections. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.