The New Dual State

Nyhet

Judicial Autonomy and Political Control in China

Inbunden, Engelska, 2026

1 489 kr

Kommande

The New Dual State examines how authoritarian regimes can institutionalize judicial autonomy without relinquishing ultimate political control. Extending the dual state theory beyond its classical and contemporary formulations, Yueduan Wang argues that the consolidation of autocratic authority can clarify and stabilize the boundary between legal order and arbitrary power, thereby permitting limited judicial independence. Using China as the central case, the book shows how political centralization enabled the regime to insulate judges from local officials, suppress unsanctioned extrajudicial interventions, and channel politically sensitive disputes away from the courts through the repression of legal activism and the expansion of state-led mediation. These measures have produced a system in which courts demonstrate increasing professionalism and autonomy in routine cases, while the regime retains decisive authority over politically salient matters. Grounded in extensive fieldwork and framed by comparative legal theory, the book advances a compelling framework for understanding authoritarian legality.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2026-08-31
Vikt500 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor200
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9781009661676

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Yueduan Wang is Assistant Professor at Peking University's School of Government and Institute of Public Governance. He holds a JD and an SJD from Harvard Law School and specializes in comparative constitutional law and judicial politics. He is the author of Experimentalist Constitutions: Subnational Innovations in China, India, and the United States (Harvard, 2024). His research on China's political–legal system and its comparative significance has appeared in leading journals, including the International Journal of Constitutional Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, Regulation & Governance, Law & Social Inquiry, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, and The China Quarterly.

Part I. Foundations: 1. Autonomy in duality: judicial (in)dependence under authoritarianism; 2. The Chinese case: judicial politics under Xi Jinping; Part II. Autonomy Through Discipline: 3. Reforming the courts: centralization and accountability under Xi; 4. 'Rule of law is the new political line': party campaigns against extrajudicial intervention; 5. Institutionalizing lawless: formalizing political control over the courts; Part III. Depoliticization Through Dejudicialization: 6. Taming legal mavericks: repression and cooptation of court-based resistance; 7. From courtroom to neighborhood committee: diverting disputes from legal channels; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. More autocracy, more autonomy? The political logic of the new dual state; Epilogue: comparative reflections; Appendix A. Data and methodology; Appendix B. Glossary; Appendix C. Key dates and events; Bibliography; Index.

'More than a study of China's legal system, The New Dual State is an important contribution to comparative constitutional theory, offering a sophisticated and empirically grounded modification of Ernst Fraenkel's foundational work to identify the conditions under which an authoritarian state can create a judicial system that stably decides ordinary cases according to law rather than the rulers' prerogative.' Mark Tushnet, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School