The Fundamentals of Ethics
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
1 149 kr
Finns i fler format (2)
Produktinformation
- Utgivningsdatum2024-07-17
- Mått142 x 208 x 16 mm
- Vikt481 g
- FormatHäftad
- SpråkEngelska
- Antal sidor512
- Upplaga6
- FörlagOUP USA
- ISBN9780197697474
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Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author, editor, or coeditor of several books including Living Ethics (OUP, 2018) and The Ethical Life, Fourth Edition (OUP, 2017). He is also the editor of Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
- PrefaceNew to the Sixth EditionInstructor's Manual and Companion WebsiteA Note on the Companion VolumeAcknowledgmentsINTRODUCTIONPART oneThe Good LifeChapter 1: Hedonism: Its Powerful AppealCHAPTER 2: Is Happiness All That Matters?CHAPTER 3Getting What You WantA Variety of Good LivesPersonal AuthorityAvoiding Objective ValuesMotivationJustifying the Pursuit of Self-InterestKnowledge of the GoodDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 4Problems for the Desire TheoryGetting What You Want May Not Be Necessary for Promoting Your GoodGetting What You Want May Not Be Sufficient for Promoting Your GoodDesires Based on False BeliefsDisinterested and Other-Regarding DesiresDisappointmentIgnorance of Desire SatisfactionImpoverished DesiresThe Paradox of Self-Harm and Self-SacrificeThe Fallibility of Our Deepest DesiresConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionPART twoNormative Ethics: Doing the Right ThingCHAPTER 5Morality and ReligionFirst Assumption: Religious Belief Is Needed for Moral MotivationSecond Assumption: Moral Conduct Is Rational only if God ExistsThird Assumption: God Is the Creator of MoralityFourth Assumption: Religion Is an Essential Source of Moral GuidanceConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 6Natural LawThe Theory and Its AttractionsThree Conceptions of Human NatureHuman Nature as Animal NatureHuman Nature Is What Is InnateHuman Nature Is What All Humans Have in CommonNatural PurposesThe Argument from HumanityConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 7Psychological EgoismEgoism and AltruismDoes It Matter Whether Psychological Egoism Is True?The Argument from Our Strongest DesiresThe Argument from Expected BenefitTwo Egoistic StrategiesAppealing to the Guilty ConscienceExpanding the Realm of Self-InterestLetting the Evidence DecideConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 8Ethical EgoismWhy Be Moral?Two Popular Arguments for Ethical EgoismThe Self-Reliance ArgumentThe Libertarian ArgumentThe Best Argument for Ethical EgoismThree Problems for Ethical EgoismEgoism Violates Core Moral BeliefsEgoism Cannot Allow for the Existence of Moral RightsEgoism Arbitrarily Makes My Interests All-ImportantConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 9Consequentialism: Its Nature and AttractionsThe Nature of ConsequentialismIts StructureMaximizing GoodnessMoral KnowledgeActual Versus Expected ResultsAssessing Actions and IntentionsThe Attractions of UtilitarianismImpartialityThe Ability to Justify Conventional Moral WisdomConflict ResolutionMoral FlexibilityThe Scope of the Moral CommunitySlippery Slope ArgumentsDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 10Consequentialism: Its DifficultiesMeasuring Well-BeingUtilitarianism Is Very DemandingDeliberationMotivationActionImpartialityNo Intrinsic Wrongness (or Rightness)The Problem of InjusticePotential Solutions to the Problem of InjusticeJustice Is Also Intrinsically ValuableInjustice Is Never OptimificJustice Must Sometimes Be SacrificedRule ConsequentialismConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 11The Kantian Perspective: Fairness and JusticeConsistency and FairnessThe Principle of UniversalizabilityMorality and RationalityAssessing the Principle of UniversalizabilityIntegrityKant on Absolute Moral DutiesDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 12The Kantian Perspective: Autonomy, Free Will, and RespectThe Principle of HumanityThe Importance of Rationality and AutonomyThe Problem of Free WillFour Problems with the Principle of HumanityVaguenessDetermining Just DesertsMoral LuckThe Scope of the Moral CommunityThe Good Will and Moral WorthConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 13The Social Contract Tradition: The Theory and Its AttractionsThe Lure of ProceduralismThe Background of the Social Contract TheoryThe Prisoner's DilemmaCooperation and the State of NatureThe Advantages of ContractarianismMorality Is Essentially a Social PhenomenonContractarianism Explains and Justifies the Content of the Basic Moral RulesContractarianism Offers a Method for Justifying Every Moral RuleContractarianism Explains the Objectivity of MoralityContractarianism Explains Why It Is Sometimes Acceptable to Break the Moral RulesMore Advantages: Morality and the LawContractarianism Justifies a Basic Moral Duty to Obey the LawThe Contractarian Justification of Legal PunishmentContractarianism Justifies the State's Role in Criminal LawContractarianism and Civil DisobedienceDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 14The Social Contract Tradition: Problems and ProspectsWhy Be Moral?The Role of ConsentDisagreement among the ContractorsThe Scope of the Moral CommunityConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 15Moral AbsolutismIs Torture Always Immoral?Preventing CatastrophesThe Doctrine of Double EffectA Reply to the Argument from Disaster PreventionHow the DDE Threatens Act ConsequentialismDistinguishing Intention from ForesightMoral Conflict and ContradictionIs Moral Absolutism Irrational?The Doctrine of Doing and AllowingConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 16Prima Facie Duties and Ethical ParticularismRoss's Ethic of Prima Facie DutiesThe Advantages of Ross's ViewThere are Many Fundamental Moral ConsiderationsWe Are Sometimes Permitted to Break the Moral RulesMoral ConflictMoral RegretAddressing the Anti-absolutist ArgumentsA Problem for Ross's ViewThe Appeal to Self-EvidenceSelf-Evidence and the Testing of Moral TheoriesKnowing the Right Thing to DoEthical ParticularismThree Problems for Ethical ParticularismIts Lack of UnityAccounting for Moral KnowledgeSome Things Possess Permanent Moral ImportanceConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 17Virtue EthicsThe Standard of Right ActionMoral ComplexityMoral UnderstandingMoral EducationThe Nature of VirtueVirtue and the Good LifeObjectionsTragic DilemmasDoes Virtue Ethics Offer Adequate Moral Guidance?Is Virtue Ethics Too Demanding?Who Are the Moral Role Models?Conflict and ContradictionThe Priority ProblemConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionCHAPTER 18Feminist EthicsThe Elements of Feminist EthicsMoral DevelopmentWomen's ExperienceThe Ethics of CareThe Importance of EmotionsAgainst UnificationAgainst Impartiality and AbstractionAgainst CompetitionDownplaying RightsChallenges for Feminist EthicsConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCases for Critical ReflectionPART threeMetaethics: The Status of MoralityCHAPTER 19Ethical RelativismDoubts about Objective MoralityTwo Kinds of Ethical Relativism-And Their AttractionsSome Implications of Ethical Subjectivism and Cultural RelativismMoral InfallibilityMoral EquivalenceQuestioning Our Own CommitmentsMoral ProgressEthical Subjectivism and the Problem of ContradictionCultural Relativism and the Problem of ContradictionIdeal ObserversConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 20Moral NihilismError TheoryThe Theory and Its AttractionsTwo Mistaken ObjectionsExpressivismThe Theory and Its AttractionsHow Is It Possible to Argue Logically about Morality?Expressivism and AmoralistsThe Nature of Moral JudgmentConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 21Ethical ObjectivismThe Theory and Its AttractionsTen Arguments against Ethical ObjectivismObjectivity Requires AbsolutismAll Truth Is SubjectiveEqual Rights Imply Equal PlausibilityMoral Objectivity Supports DogmatismMoral Objectivity Supports IntoleranceMoral Objectivity Cannot Allow for Legitimate Cultural VariationMoral Disagreement Undermines Moral ObjectivityAtheism Undermines Moral ObjectivityThe Absence of Categorical Reasons Undermines Moral ObjectivityValues Have No Place in a Scientific WorldConclusionDiscussion QuestionsCHAPTER 22Is Moral Knowledge Possible? Five Skeptical ArgumentsThe Skeptical Argument from DisagreementCertaintyWho's to Say?Irrelevant InfluencesHume's ArgumentConclusionReferencesSuggestions for Further ReadingGlossaryIndex
It provides a solid foundation of ethical concepts and reasoning in voice that invites consideration of various positions and systems of thought to fit any introductory ethics course.
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