Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl's Logical Investigations

What does it mean to say that one experience is synthesized with others? This study is a speculative-exegetical Husserlian account of the ground, the mechanisms, and the results of synthesis. A detailed, rigorous and systematic analysis of Husserl's Logical Investigations, it argues that synthesizing consciousness must be a self-explicating system of interpretive acts driven by ongoing forward and backward references, grounding its structures as it proceeds and positing its origins as that which must have been given 'in advance'. It thus develops a dialectical phenomenology grounded in Husserl's largely untreated category of 'referring backward'. This book provides the first systematic examination of synthesis in Husserl's major early work. It offers Husserl scholars a wide range of original interpretations, on issues ranging from closed and unclosed linguistic expressions, to the indeterminacy of perspective, to the ego's return to itself.At the same time, it contributes a new model for dialogue among phenomenology, dialectics, and deconstruction, by incorporating a metaphysics of subjectivity and a structure of open-ended interpretation into a phenomenological framework.