Special Operations Success

James D. Kiras has taught at the US Air Force's school of strategy for 20 years. He has published numerous works on irregular warfare, including special operations, terrorism, and insurgency, and serves on the board of special operations organizations in the US and Sweden. He co-founded the Special Operations Research Association and co-edits Inter Populum: The Journal of Special Operations and Irregular Warfare. Professor Kiras served in the Pentagon following the 9/11 attacks and he routinely consults with various special operations units and planning and strategy staffs.

• List of FiguresList of TableList of MapsList of AbbreviationsPart I1: Introduction2: Special Operations PrecedentsPart II3: Special Operations Capabilities4: Control of Special Operations and Vertical Integration5: The Theory of Special Operations CoherencePart III6: Stretched beyond Footholds: The United Kingdom, 1971-19917: System within a System: South African Special Forces, 1972-19928: Redefining the System: US Special Operations, 1996-20169: ConclusionBibliographyIndex

In the aftermath of the use - and at times, misuse - of special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, a fresh examination of the theory underlying special operations is very germane. At least in the US and likely elsewhere, some of the core aspects of special operations seem to be in doubt. In many ways, a thorough re-examination of underlying principles and desired capabilities has become increasingly important. Although some readers in the policy world might find some of the theoretical background in this book rather heavy going, it is highly recommended for both policy makers and analysts to develop fresh approaches to the strategic use and control of special operations forces.