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Showing the complex interaction of strategy, logistics, administration, and economics, Syrett’s pioneering text brings to light some basic causes for the ultimate failure of the British war effort during the American War of Independence. This war effort was fatally compromised by the British need to support a great army and a large naval force in the western hemisphere while at the same time facing a coalition of maritime powers on the European continent.
David Syrett was Distinguished Professor of History at Queen's College, City University of New York, US.
1 The Higher Chain of Command2 The Navy Board3 The Lower Chain of Command4 Short-term Procurement of Tonnage5 Long-term Procurement of Tonnage6 The Measurement, Inspection and Fitting-out of Ships Entering the Transport Service7 The Growth of the Provision Problem, 1775-798 The Navy Board's Victuallers9 The Navy Board's Transports10 Shipping and the American War: A ConclusionAppendicesBibliographyIndex