Russia's emergence as a Great Power in the eighteenth century is usually attributed to Peter I's radical programme of 'Westernising' reforms. But the Russian military did not simply copy European armies. Adapting the tactics of its neighbours on both sides, Russia created a powerful strategy of its own, integrating steppe defence with European concerns. In Russia's Wars of Emergence, Carol Belkin Stevens examines the social and political factors underpinning Muscovite military history, the eventual success of the Russian Empire and the sacrifices made for power.
Carol Belkin Stevens is an Associate Professor at Colgate University, Hamilton, New York, specialising in early modern Russia. She is the author of Soldiers on the Steppe (1996) and has been published in numerous journals including Russian History.
PART I 1450-1598The constituents for Muscovite power, c.1450 Creating a Muscovite army, 1462-1533 The army that won an empire PART II 1598-1697The political prelude to military reform The Thirteen Years War, 1654-67 The steppe frontier after Razzin, 1672-97 PART III 1698-1730Peter the Great and the beginning of the Great Northern War Military instiutionalization after PoltavaConclusion: Russiawithout Peter