Rightness as Fairness

Marcus Arvan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tampa, US. He works primarily in ethics and social-political philosophy, as well as metaphysics and philosophy of science. His work has appeared in various journals including Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, and The Philosophical Forum.

• List of Tables Acknowledgements INTRODUCTION PART I: ETHICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1. Distinguishing Truth from Seeming-Truth 2. Seven Principles of Theory-Selection 2.1. Firm Foundations 2.2. Internal Coherence 2.3. External Coherence 2.4. Explanatory Power 2.5. Unity 2.6. Parsimony 2.7. Fruitfulness 3. The Case for Instrumentalism 3.1. The Firmest Foundation3.2. The Promise of Parsimony, Unity, Explanatory Power, and Fruitfulness3.3. Advantages over Alternatives3.3.1. Advantages over Intuitionism3.3.2. Advantages over Reflective Equilibrium 3.3.3. Advantages over Moral-Language Analysis3.3.4. Advantages over Constitutivism3.3.5. Advantages over Second and Third-Personalism3.3.6. Advantages over Sterba's Dialecticalism3.3.7. Conclusion 4. Disarming Initial Concerns4.1. The Wrong Kinds of Reasons?4.2. Not a Firm Foundation?4.3. Unconvincing and Artificial?4.4. Three Promissory Notes4.4.1. Not the Wrong Kinds of Reasons?4.4.2. Firm Foundations After All?4.4.3. Convincing and Intuitive? 5. ConclusionPART II: THE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SELVES1. Our Capacities to Care about Our Past and Future2. The Problem of Possible Future Selves2.1. Possible Futures2.2. Possible Psychologies2.3. Possible Choices2.4. A Very Real Problem3. Morality as the Solution?4. Is the Problem Too Contingent?5. Two Nonsolutions5.1. Nonsolution 1: Probable Futures 5.2. Nonsolution 2: Diachronic Motivational Consistency6. Conclusion: An Unsolved ProblemPART III: THE CATEGORICAL-INSTRUMENTAL IMPERATIVE 1. Interests in Diachronic Cooperation2. Three Types of Interests2.1. Involuntary Interests2.2. Semivoluntary Interests2.3. Voluntary Interests3. The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative4. Just Conscience?5. An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Possible Future Selves?6. ConclusionPART IV: THREE UNIFIED FORMULATIONS1. The Humanity-and-Sentience Formulation1.1. Possible Other-Human-Regarding Interests1.2. Possible Nonhuman-Animal-Regarding Interests 1.3. Possible Sentient-Being-Regarding Interests1.4. Derivation of the Humanity-and-Sentience Formulation 2. The Kingdom-of-Human-and-Sentient-Ends Formulation3. Advantages over Kantian Ethics3.1. Firmer Foundations3.2. Greater Internal Coherence3.3. Greater External Coherence3.4. Greater Explanatory Power, Unity and Parsimony3.5. Greater Fruitfulness4. ConclusionPART V: THE MORAL ORIGINAL POSITION1. Rawls' Original Position1.1. Rawls' Kantian Rationale 1.2. Rawls' Reflective-Equilibrium Rationale 1.3. Rawls' Public Reason Rationale 2. Some Common Critiques2.1. Kantian Critiques 2.2. Reflective-Equilibrium Critiques 2.3. Public Reason Critiques3. The Case for a Moral Original Position4. Corroborating the Critiques4.1. Corroborating Kantian Critiques4.2. Corroborating Reflective-Equilibrium Critiques 4.3. Corroborating Public Reason Critiques5. ConclusionPART VI: RIGHTNESS AS FAIRNESS 1. Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness1.1. The Principle of Negative Fairness1.2. The Principle of Positive Fairness1.3. The Principle of Fair Negotiation 1.4. The Principle of Virtues of Fairness2. Rightness as Fairness: A Unified Standard of Right and Wrong3. Rightness as Fairness in Practice: Principled Fair Negotiation3.1. Kant's Four Cases 3.2. How Numbers Should Count: Trolleys, Torture, and Unwilling Organ Donors3.3. World Poverty3.4. Distribution of Scarce Medical Resources3.5. The Ethical Treatment of Animals4. ConclusionPART VII: LIBERTARIAN EGALITARIAN COMMUNITARIANISM1. Libertarianism, Egalitarianism, and Communitarianism1.1. Libertarianism: Attractions and Critiques 1.2. Egalitarianism: Attractions and Critiques 1.3. Egalitarianism: Attractions and Critiques 2. The Case for Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism3. Additional Advantages3.1. (Qualified) Fair Negotiation over Divisiveness3.2. Resolving the Scope and Requirements of Justice3.3. Resolving the Ideal-Nonideal Theory Distinction4. ConclusionPART VIII: EVALUATING RIGHTNESS AS FAIRNESS1. Firmer Foundations2. Greater Internal Coherence3. Greater External Coherence4. Greater Explanatory Power5. Greater Unity6. Greater Parsimony7. Greater Fruitfulness8. ConclusionReferencesBibliographyIndex

“Marcus Arvan’s Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory is a recent work in normative ethics that makes an interesting and worthwhile contribution to the field … . It is written in an analytical style, its position is clear and its arguments are structured and expressed well throughout the text. … I would especially recommend it to readers interested in normative ethics and instrumentalism.” (Liam Moore, Res Publica, Vol. 23, 2017)