George J. Mailath (Ph. D., Princeton University) is the Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. Larry Samuelson (Ph. D., University of Illinois) is the Antoine Augustin Cournot Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin.

• 1: Introduction PART I. Games with Perfect Monitoring 2: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring 3: The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring 4: How Long Is Forever? 5: Variations on the Game 6: Applications PART II. Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring 7: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 8: Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs 9: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring 10: Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 11: Applications PART III. Games with Private Monitoring 12: Private Monitoring 13: Almost Public Monitoring Games 14: Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games PART IV. Reputations 15: Reputations with Short-Lived Players 16: Reputations with Long-Lived Players 17: Finitely Repeated Games 18: Modeling Reputations

Repeated Games and Reputaitons is a much-needed addition to ranks of advanced game theory books. It has features that will appeal to both economic theorists and applied economists in various fields. In addition to being a useful reference book, it would make a great textbook for a second field course in game theory and would be a useful supplementary reference in many microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory and industrial organisation field courses.