Repeated Games and Reputations

Long-Run Relationships

Inbunden, Engelska, 2006

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Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2006-10-12
Mått254 x 180 x 35 mm
Vikt1 361 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor672
FörlagOUP USA
ISBN9780195300796

Tillhör följande kategorier

1: IntroductionPART I. Games with Perfect Monitoring2: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring3: The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring4: How Long Is Forever?5: Variations on the Game6: ApplicationsPART II. Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring7: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring8: Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs9: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring10: Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring11: ApplicationsPART III. Games with Private Monitoring12: Private Monitoring13: Almost Public Monitoring Games14: Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring GamesPART IV. Reputations15: Reputations with Short-Lived Players16: Reputations with Long-Lived Players17: Finitely Repeated Games18: Modeling Reputations

Repeated Games and Reputaitons is a much-needed addition to ranks of advanced game theory books. It has features that will appeal to both economic theorists and applied economists in various fields. In addition to being a useful reference book, it would make a great textbook for a second field course in game theory and would be a useful supplementary reference in many microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory and industrial organisation field courses.