Repeated Games and Reputations

George J. Mailath (Ph. D., Princeton University) is the Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. Larry Samuelson (Ph. D., University of Illinois) is the Antoine Augustin Cournot Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin.

• 1: IntroductionPART I. Games with Perfect Monitoring2: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring3: The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring4: How Long Is Forever?5: Variations on the Game6: ApplicationsPART II. Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring7: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring8: Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs9: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring10: Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring11: ApplicationsPART III. Games with Private Monitoring12: Private Monitoring13: Almost Public Monitoring Games14: Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring GamesPART IV. Reputations15: Reputations with Short-Lived Players16: Reputations with Long-Lived Players17: Finitely Repeated Games18: Modeling Reputations

Repeated Games and Reputaitons is a much-needed addition to ranks of advanced game theory books. It has features that will appeal to both economic theorists and applied economists in various fields. In addition to being a useful reference book, it would make a great textbook for a second field course in game theory and would be a useful supplementary reference in many microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory and industrial organisation field courses.