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India is widely regarded as the most celebrated case of a "failed" developmental state, seemingly the exception that belies the prediction of a triumphant Asian century. Its central political and economic institutions have been variously characterized as both "soft" and "strong"—at once weak, predatory, and interventionist. Aseema Sinha presents an innovative model that questions conventional views of economic development by showing that the Indian state is a divided leviathan: its developmental failure is the combined product of central-local interactions and political choices by regional elites. To develop this disaggregated model, she examines three regional states with sharply divergent development trajectories: Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu. Drawing on recent work in comparative political economy, the theory of nested games, incentive theory, and an ethnographic analysis of business actors, this study directs analytical attention at the creation of micro-institutions at the subnational level, explores the role of provinces in shaping investment flows, and considers the role of federalism as a mediating institution shaping the vertical strategies of provinces. A comparative chapter applies the model to data from China, Brazil, Russia, and the former Soviet Union.
Aseema Sinha is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In 2004-05, she will be a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
ContentsList of Tables, Figures, and MapsPrefaceA Note on TerminologyList of AbbreviationsPart One. Introduction and Theoretical Framework1. The Puzzle of Developmental Failure and SuccessThe Puzzle of India's Developmental StateUnpacking Developmental States: A Multilevel FrameworkApplying the Framework to IndiaGlobalization in India (1991–2004)Infranational Comparisons and Comparative PoliticsPlan of the Book2. A Theory of Polycentric HierarchyIndia and Comparative PoliticsA Theory of a Multilevel Hierarchy: Territory, Divided Government, and Nested GamesBusiness Responses and Investor Behavior in a Dirigiste but Multilevel StateDesign of Study: Selection of CasesConclusionPart Two. National-Level Analysis3. Disaggregating the Central StateRegional Variation in Large-Scale InvestmentA Competing Political Explanation: Central DiscriminationAn Alternative Institutionalist Explanation: The Central State Designed to FailPolitical Economy of the Divided StateLiberalization and the Central State in IndiaConclusionPart Three. Subnational Variation Mapped4. Regional Strategies toward the Dirigiste StateBureaucratic Developmentalism in GujaratWest Bengal: The Strategy of Partisan ConfrontationMixed Vertical Strategy in Tamil Nadu: Anti-Center Mobilization (1967–77) and Opportunistic Alliance Formation (1980s)The Phase of Anti-Center Strategy Alliance Formation and Opportunistic Bargaining with the CenterVertical Interactions in Pre-1991 IndiaVertical Interactions in Post-1991 IndiaConclusion5. The Subnational State as a Developmental ActorWhy Are Regional Institutions Important, and How Do They Matter?Developmental Strategies in Indian Regional StatesInstitutional Capacities in India's RegionsSticky Institutions in West Bengal, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu after 1991: A Comparative Institutional AnalysisConclusion6. Divided Loyalties: The Regional Politics of DivergenceGujarat: The Roots of Classic Competitive CapitalismWest Bengal: Politics of Vertical Confrontation and Regional ProtectionTamil Nadu: Cultural Subnationalism and IndustrializationConclusion 7. Weapons of the Strong: Business Responses in the RegionsBusiness Responses to LicensingState-Level Entry CostsIncentives versus Infrastructure: Corporate ResponsesInstitutional CredibilityMicro-Regulatory Costs at the State LevelConclusionPart Four. India in Comparative Perspective8. Comparative ExtensionsA Comparative Theory of Developmental Failure and SuccessApplying the Theory to Other CasesThe Impact of Size and Territorial Differentiation on Central Rulers (Proposition IV)Comparing China with Democratic India and Democratic Brazil: Does Democracy Matter?Conclusion9. Conclusion: Regional Landscapes and Economic Development in Dirigiste StatesLessons from Subnational Pathways in IndiaNational Political Institutions and Regional StrategiesNeoliberalism, Institutional Change, and Regional ActivismToward a Comparative Theory of Developmental Failure and SuccessAppendix: A Game Theory Model of Economic Policy in a Centralized FederationNotesWorks CitedIndex
