Anticorruption reforms provide political cover for public officials, but do they really work? This text seeks to show how the proliferating regulations and oversight mechanisms designed to prevent or root out corruption seriously undermine the ability to govern. Over the last century, the authors argue, society has become enmeshed in alternating cycles of corruption and reform. Governments attribute the absence of scandal to existing regulations, and see their reoccurrence as proof of the need of additional laws. Using the anticorruption efforts in New York City to illustrate their argument, the authors seeks to deomonstrate the costly inefficiencies of pursuing absolute integrity. They assert that by constraining decision makers' discretion, shaping priorities, and causing delays, corruption control - no less than corruption itself - has contributed to the contemporary crisis in public administration.

Anticorruption reforms provide political cover for public officials, but do they really work? This text seeks to show how the proliferating regulations and oversight mechanisms designed to prevent or root out corruption seriously undermine the ability to govern. Over the last century, the authors argue, society has become enmeshed in alternating cycles of corruption and reform. Governments attribute the absence of scandal to existing regulations, and see their reoccurrence as proof of the need of additional laws. Using the anticorruption efforts in New York City to illustrate their argument, the authors seeks to deomonstrate the costly inefficiencies of pursuing absolute integrity. They assert that by constraining decision makers' discretion, shaping priorities, and causing delays, corruption control - no less than corruption itself - has contributed to the contemporary crisis in public administration.

Anticorruption reforms provide political cover for public officials, but do they really work? This text seeks to show how the proliferating regulations and oversight mechanisms designed to prevent or root out corruption seriously undermine the ability to govern. Over the last century, the authors argue, society has become enmeshed in alternating cycles of corruption and reform. Governments attribute the absence of scandal to existing regulations, and see their reoccurrence as proof of the need of additional laws. Using the anticorruption efforts in New York City to illustrate their argument, the authors seeks to deomonstrate the costly inefficiencies of pursuing absolute integrity. They assert that by constraining decision makers' discretion, shaping priorities, and causing delays, corruption control - no less than corruption itself - has contributed to the contemporary crisis in public administration.