Nuclear Politics

Alexandre Debs (PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Connecticut, where he is also co-Director of the Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy. His work centers on international security and applied game theory. Specifically, it investigates the causes of war, nuclear proliferation, and democratization, and has appeared in such journals as the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Security, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. Debs received a Rhodes scholarship in 2000 and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, California in 2011-12. Nuno P. Monteiro (PhD, University of Chicago, 2009) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Connecticut, where he is also Director of Research of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy. His work centers on international relations theory and security studies, specifically great-power politics, power transitions, nuclear studies, the causes of war, deterrence theory, military occupations, and the philosophy of science. He is the author of Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge, 2014) as well as articles published in International Organization, International Security, International Theory, and Perspectives on Politics, among other venues.

• Figures and tables; Abbreviations and acronyms; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. A strategic theory of nuclear proliferation; 3. The historical patterns of nuclear proliferation; 4. Adversaries and proliferation; 5. Loose allies and proliferation; 6. Close allies and proliferation; 7. Conclusion; Appendix 1. Coding rules; Appendix 2. Other cases of nuclear development; Appendix 3. Puzzling cases of no nuclear development; Appendix 4. Formal theory; Bibliography; Index.

'This impressive book is a model of judicious scholarship and a landmark in the study of nuclear proliferation. Focusing on the strategic interactions between would-be proliferators, their adversaries, and their allies, Debs and Monteiro present a simple and powerful theory explaining why some states seek the bomb while others choose to forego it. The logic of their argument is straightforward and the evidence they present is compelling. No one interested in strategy, security, or the role of nuclear weapons can afford to ignore this work.' Stephen Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Massachusetts